

Cooperation through Institutionalization? A Critical Assessment of Transatlantic Institutional Cooperation Mechanisms

Vincent BRICART¹

Abstract:

The transatlantic dialogue between the European Union and the United States has long been a cornerstone of global diplomacy, underpinned by shared values, robust economic ties, and mutual strategic interests. Over the years numerous dialogues, regulatory cooperation, political agreements, formal treaties or informal institutions, have been established through the years contributing to the creation of an institutional and resilient framework for managing their bilateral relations and facilitate cooperation. Efforts to revitalize this partnership have given rise in recent years to initiatives such as the *Trade and Technology Council*, to harmonize EU and US policies on supply chain resilience, trade standards, and emerging technologies. These initiatives complement long-standing platforms such as the *Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue* which facilitates exchanges between lawmakers. Such mechanisms aim to bridge policy differences and sustain dialogue, recognizing that coordinated action is essential to maintaining transatlantic influence amid rising international competition and internal divergences. However, geopolitical challenges, regulatory discrepancies, and protectionist tendencies, often complicate smooth cooperation. This paper thus intent to evaluate the progress of both forum in strengthening transatlantic alignment from 2021 to 2024. It concludes by stating that while they both play a critical role in fostering mutual trust and understanding between transatlantic actors, their results are limited by their lacks of direct competencies, low ambitions and persistent regulatory divergences, often resulting in broad declarations rather than concrete outcomes. Nevertheless, the paper argues that their capacity to support dialogues, long-term understanding and gradual convergence is crucial, not as a substitute for formal diplomacy and multilateralism, but as a complement to them.

Key Words: Transatlantic Relations, Institutionalized Dialogues, Institutionalization, Trade and Technology Council, Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue

¹ PhD Candidate, Researcher, and Teaching Assistant at the Center for International Relations Studies (CEFIR) of the University of Liège (ULiège). Since 2018, he has organized and led numerous seminars and conferences on U.S. foreign policy. His research focuses on U.S. foreign policy, the international identity and actorness of the European Union, and EU-U.S. relations. His doctoral project is entitled "The Purpose of Transatlantic Interregionalism for the Construction of the European Union's International Identity".

Introduction

The transatlantic relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) has historically been pivotal to global diplomacy, grounded in shared values, economic ties, and mutual interests in tackling common global challenges. In this context, institutionalized dialogues such as the *Trade and Technology Council* (TTC) and the *Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue* (TLD) are important structured platforms. Aiming to ensure that both powers can effectively collaborate and exchange on critical issues such as trade, technology regulation, and global governance, the importance of such bilateral forums lies not only in their capacity to facilitate dialogue but also because they can help to establish long-term frameworks for cooperation.

The creation of the TTC in June 2021 was meant to be a significant step in revitalizing economic and political cooperation between both EU and US executives. Focused on critical issues such as supply chains, trade policies on new technologies, and technological standards, this forum complements the more ancient TLD, which since 1999 has facilitated dialogues between the legislators from the EU and the US. Unlike many top-level initiatives that often disappear with the change in the executives from one part, the TLD's longevity reflects a deeper commitment to fostering people-to-people connections and institutional resilience.

Formalized dialogues like the TLD and TTC are especially relevant as both the EU and the US face competition in the field of global governance from emerging powers, particularly China. Their ability to present a united front on issues like digital trade, supply chain resilience, sanctions, climate policy and other transnational issues could be crucial since, by harmonizing their approach and expanding platforms for dialogue (like the TTC-TLD) the EU and the US have the potential not only to coordinate their action on trade rules, but also to align their policy on non-economical topic when their interest converge and thus exert significant influence over the rest of the world. The ongoing shift toward more informal modes of coordination, characterized by the use of soft laws and non-binding cooperative platforms, reflects a new model of transatlantic engagement capable of promoting shared values and approach on a global scale. Given their respective historical role in shaping global standards and governance, this raises a key question: can institutionalized platforms like the TTC and the TLD enable the EU and the US to jointly reassert their leadership in global standard-setting? This paper thus seeks to assess whether or not the TTC and TLD have contributed doing so by analyzing the objectives, topics and outcomes of these forums between 2021 and 2024.

The article is structured in five parts. It begins by establishing the conceptual foundations of transatlantic diplomatic dialogue, defining key terms such as institutionalization,

multilateralism, and global governance. The second section provides a general overview of the nature of the EU-US relation, of the existing institutionalized dialogues since the 1990s, and of the impact that a closer relationship between both actors could have on governance. The third part offers an analysis of the objectives, structures, and operational frameworks of the TTC and the TLD. The fourth part develops the methodology by which the article will evaluate the effectiveness of both forums. The fifth part relates and evaluates the debates and topics addressed by these entities from 2021 to 2024. It compares the agenda and context from one session to another, highlights the evolution or stagnation of the topics discussed, and assesses their outcomes and challenges. The analysis is drawn on the content of official documents and on expert opinions.

Definitions and Conceptual Frameworks

To define the scope of the study, the article first needs to define what it means when it talks about “diplomatic dialogue”, “institutionalization”, “multilateralism” and “governance”.

For international relations theorists, the study of dialogues is well established, as they view such exchanges as mechanisms for either showcasing power dynamics in security and profit matters, fostering cooperation through information sharing, enabling mutual persuasion to build shared understandings, or expressing an actor’s international identity (Fierke, 1999; Keohane, 1988; Risse, 2000; Blanc, 2023a). When focused on the matter of trade and open exchange, some consider that those types of dialogues, which encourages closer cooperation, reflect that the relationship is based on high quality talks (Blanc, 2023a). Diplomatic practice of dialogue encompasses various activities such as negotiations, intelligence gathering and joint statement writing (Pouliot & Cornut, 2015). For this paper, when this article talks about transatlantic dialogue, it uses the definition made by Emmanuelle Blanc according to whom, a dialogue is a “*face-to-face interaction in an institutionalized framework*” (Blanc, 2018 p. 16.).

When it comes to institutionalization in diplomatic relations, the international regime theory defines it as a dynamic aimed at structuring diplomatic cooperation that can take different degrees of formalization and legal constraint depending on the actors’ will (Krasner, 1982). There are thus two types of institutionalization: formal and informal. The first one involves the creation of permanent institutions that works with treaty-based rules, binding procedures, and autonomy (Keohane, 1984; Stone, 2011). For example, the Investment Court System, which would have been created if the *Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership* (TTIP) had succeeded, suit this description. The second one, informal institutionalization, works by contrast through flexible non-binding mechanisms with no legal foundations (Abbott & Snidal,

2000). Frequent bilateral summits, working groups, and transatlantic forums like the TTC and the TLD are examples of diplomacy through low formalization.

Finally, when the article refers to multilateralism, it refers to interstate coordination and cooperation among states inside the range of a treaty or of an international institution to address global issues (Ruggie, 1992). By contrast, global governance in this article refers to the broader set of mechanisms, institutions, rules, and processes (formal or informal) through which international actors coordinate their actions to tackle issue-specific transnational challenges (Rosenau, 1995; Weiss & Wilkinson, 2014). For example, in the context of transatlantic relations it may focus on the regulation of emerging technologies and or the control of exportation of dual-use items.

Transatlantic cooperation: an overview

The Nature of the EU-US Dialogue: A Close Partnership of Cooperation Amid Asymmetry and Persistent Obstacles

The transatlantic relationship can be described as a complex mix of cooperation and competition. The EU-US dialogue is unique in the frequency and intensity of its diplomatic consultations, covering a broad spectrum of areas, from trade to internal and external policy. As both powers navigate a shifting global landscape, their partnership, anchored in shared democratic values and economic might, remain stable and grow as the competence of the EU, as well as the common challenges, increase. It is characterized by soft laws, flexible hybrid forms of governance and “low-intensity” institutionalization, often raising questions about the effectiveness of transatlantic cooperation due to the lack of deep commitment (Fahey, 2023; 2024). While this relationship may be institutionally “light”, it is built on a stable and resilient foundation of shared sympathy, despite surface-level political fluctuations (Blanc, 2023b).

Economically, according to international relation theorists, the US and the EU are mostly considered as equal, with both of them having significant leverage in international trade negotiations and global regulatory governance (Elgström, 2007). Furthermore, the size of their markets and the strength of their institutions make the EU and the US equally influential in global regulatory cooperation (Evenett & Stern, 2011). Despite economic parity, dialogues between the US and the EU are often considered as unequal, and cooperation in certain areas remains challenging. The US often adopts pragmatic, rigid and pressing negotiation positions shaped by domestic legislative constraints, showing limited flexibility in reaching political agreements (Quinney, 2002; Propp, 2023). On the EU side, fragmented political unity, institutional complexity, and member states’ sovereignty in hybrid matters complicate both the negotiation and ratification of agreements (Bosse-Platière & Rapoport, 2019). Many

transatlantic agreements on trade, regulatory or political matters have been compromised at their very start due to their non-compliance to internal legislation, suboptimal compromises, failure to secure national ratification or limited added value to existing treaties (Fahey, 2013; Petersmann, 2015; Mayr, 2017; Gardner, 2020). For example, the negotiations of new *Mutual Recognition Agreements* on standards and diplomas, often falter under the rigidity of US federal authorities (Fahey, 2023). Similarly, agreements on which negotiators have reached a consensus can be rejected by the European Parliament (EP) like the *SWIFT Agreement* (Monar, 2010) or considered as invalid by the Court of Justice of the EU like the *EU-US Privacy Shield* (Fahey & Terpan, 2021).

Furthermore, while both the EU and the US have considerable influence to shape international standards through multilateralism and global governance, their approach differ. The EU is characterized as a “normative power”, promoting global standards through regulatory frameworks in matters like trade, environmental policies, and human rights (Manners, 2002; Nunes 2011). By setting international standards that others must abide by in order to enter its market, the EU exerts indirect influence on global rules, giving the EU a competitive advantage that supports its political objectives (Smith & Steffenson, 2023). By contrast, the US’s influence relies on its dominant position and structural power (Strange 1994; Quinney, 2002), by combining military dominance and economic leverage, with cultural and technological leadership. Besides, it uses its leadership on global institutions like the World Bank, NATO, and the IMF, or through bilateral agreements to set international norms that align with its national interests and legislation (Nye, 1990; Strange 1994). Its laws also have extraterritorial reach, amplified by the global influence of its currency (Prasad, 2014; Leblanc-Wohrer, 2019).

Stemming from these differences, the dialogue between the EU and the US to harmonize international standards has been marked by complexities. Though both are major global regulatory powers, their approach differs in key areas like data flow, corporate sustainability, and environmental policies (Young, 2023; Fahey, 2024) For example, the EU applies stricter rules regarding carbon emissions, green energy, data protection and digital regulation (Fahey, 2024), while US legislators, especially Republicans, favor less restrictive approach to business regulation (Belton & Graham, 2019). The EU has also tighter food safety standards, imposing restrictions on GMOs and pesticides use, by contrast with more tolerant US standards (Pollack & Shaffer, 2009). Furthermore, the EU favors centralized harmonization with common standards, while the US approach accepts differing regulations if their outcomes are equivalent (Mathis, 2014). These differences complicate regulatory alignment, even though over the years numerous agreements have been signed in areas like competition, privacy, customs, and

veterinary standards. Transatlantic negotiators frequently favor quick resolutions rather than addressing disputes through a big comprehensive agreement. Furthermore, issues related to regulatory sovereignty and transparency are persistent (Chase, 2021; Fahey, 2024).

Institutional Realities and Existing Dialogues

Despite these facts, since the end of the cold war numerous dialogues, regulatory cooperation and political agreements, in the form of formal treaties or informal institutions, have taken place through the years, contributing to the establishment of an institutional framework for managing bilateral relations (Gardner, 2020). Over the past three decades, about 35 international agreements have been reached on a wide range of issues, many of which focusing on trade, while others are focusing on competition, privacy, data transfer, customs, veterinary standards, extradition, police and judicial cooperation (US Department of State, 2020; 2023). Significant failures in reaching an agreement or political tensions have sometimes tended to overshadow these achievements. Besides, the EU and the US have established through that same period a dense network of institutional dialogues at different levels to make decision makers, experts or representatives of legislative corps meet. While often imperfect, those dialogues play a crucial role in managing bilateral relations (Smith & Steffenson, 2023; Propp, 2023; Fahey, 2024).

The *Transatlantic Declaration* (TD) and the *New Transatlantic Agenda* (NTA), created in the 1990s, marked the beginning of institutionalized US-EU dialogue for cooperation after the Cold War. While the TD offered a forum for discussing political, economic, and security matters, it was mostly symbolic (TD on EC-US Relations, 1990). This was enhanced by the NTA, which was more practical and had four main objectives: advancing trade, addressing global issues, advancing democracy, and strengthening people-to-people ties. It also included structured mechanisms, such as annual summits and working groups (The NTA, 1995). Both declarations were also pivotal in formalizing interparliamentary ties and dialogue between the EP and the US Congress that led to the TLD in 1999 (Blanc, 2018; Jančić, 2023). In 1998, the *Transatlantic Economic Partnership* was established to overcome trade barriers, to foster economic integration and to streamline regulatory differences (The Transatlantic Economic Partnership, 1998; Pollack & Schaffer, 2001). Despite political disagreements over the years, economic ties remained relatively resilient and in 2007 the *Transatlantic Economic Council* (TEC) was created to further enhance regulatory convergence by addressing to non-tariff barriers that slowed down market access although its success was limited by disputes over trade and regulatory standards (Framework for Advancing TEC Between the EU and the US, 2007).

From 2013 to 2016, the TTIP negotiations represented the biggest common effort to establish the world's largest free-trade zone by eliminating tariffs and aligning regulatory standards,

setting an example for the world. However, the negotiations ultimately collapsed, partly due to fears of eroding European regulatory standards from civil society in Europe, reflecting the complexity of reconciling both sides on the matter (Petersmann, 2015; Bricart, 2021), and partly due to the protectionist policy initiated by the US following the election of Donald Trump. The failure of TTIP weakened transatlantic economic and regulatory alignment ambitions and was quickly followed by political tensions. Trade relations became strained, with tariffs on European goods and retaliatory measures from the EU (Dimitrova, 2020; Bricart, 2022). Despite this, institutionalized dialogue persisted, highlighting the resilience of such channels (Blanc, 2018; 2023b). Following this, the Biden administration prioritized “repairing” the strained relationship of the US with the EU, emphasizing the importance of a united front on global challenge and culminating in the establishment of the TTC to align norms on tech, trade and supply chains (European Commission, 2021a ; O’Sullivan, 2023).

The proliferation of those forums over the years can be explained in part by the significant political and economic relevance the EU and the US hold for each other, as well as the mutual benefits they derive from their cooperation. Americans appreciate transatlantic institutions for what they can accomplish in advancing US interest, while Europeans appreciate them for their durability and continuity in maintaining a stable dialogue (Transatlantic Policy Network, 2003; Dunne, 2023).

Discussion: What a closer transatlantic Cooperation could mean for standard settings, multilateralism and global governance

The EU (and its member states) and the US have for a long time been key architects and guarantors of the multilateral order and global governance, especially in global economy (Pollack & Shaffer, 2010). Their shared commitment to enhancing cooperation through governance, with the aim of setting a global example, is not new since both actors (especially the US) played a pivotal transformative role to the post-World War II and the post-Cold War international order (Petersmann, 2015). Initiatives to shape international standards have also been seen in recent times such as the negotiations over the TTIP, *the Privacy Shield* (EU-US Privacy Shield 2016) and the *Mutual Recognition Agreement* of 1998 (US-EU MRA, 1998).

Given their respective influence on global standards, deepening the EU-US partnership could initiate a renewal of the international order in which both entities would reassume pivotal roles and share leadership in setting trade standards and diplomatic frameworks (Smith & Steffenson, 2023). By aligning their regulatory policies and coordinating their approach on common issues through dialogue, the EU and US could bolster their strategic positions, particularly in response to rising influence from countries like China, whose advancing its role

in technology innovation and artificial intelligence through its *China Standards 2035* strategy. In doing so, they could reaffirm themselves as leaders in those areas (Seaman, 2020; Welfens & Hanrahan, 2022). Furthermore, given the prolonged deadlock in permanent multilateral institutions like the WTO, cooperation through informal forum offers a path to update for instance global trade rules. In order to break the current impasse and ensure the survival of the rules-based multilateral system, the US and the EU could lead by showing more adaptable and flexible means of dialogue that accommodate to the changing realities of the world (Aktoudianakis et al., 2021; Welfens & Hanrahan, 2022).

Following WW2, international cooperation has primarily been conducted through formal treaties and international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the WTO. Yet, contemporary global governance is increasingly shaped by informal mechanisms, soft law frameworks, and forums that operate outside conventional diplomatic channels or rely on non-binding agreements (Vabulas, & Snidal, 2013). Those informal entities, though having limited or no legal foundation under international law, are playing an increasingly central role (Roger & Rowan 2023). This shift is particularly visible in the way states from the transatlantic region interacts with each other's (Roger, 2023). The TTC exemplifies this. Acting as a platform for standards setting in trade and technology through soft law in the transatlantic relation, it could set the basis for future multilateral talks on global standard in areas such as artificial intelligence and e-commerce. For instance, by agreeing on a shared taxonomy and risk management framework for common AI standards (Stokes et al., 2024). This would enhance both the EU's and the US's influence in international standard-setting bodies and promote the diffusion of transatlantic standards. The same thing applies to the TLD. By fostering mutual understanding of the EP and the US Congress on regulatory approaches to address global challenges and by identifying problematic legislative divergences with strategies to resolve them, legislators could gradually align their regulations and enhance transatlantic regulatory cooperation (Jančić, 2015). This, in turn, could strengthen the global influence of transatlantic regulatory models on standards setting.

The Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue and the Trade and Technology Council: Structures, Operational Frameworks and purpose.

Both the TLD and TTC illustrate different facets of transatlantic dialogues, with the TLD focused on legislative exchange and the TTC on high-level exchange about economic and technological cooperation. While they share common democratic values, their respective goals, structures, regulatory approaches, economic philosophies, strategic priorities and engagement

levels differ significantly. The TTC serves as an example of how regular high-level discussions intent to bridge the gap of economic barriers and trade standards in crucial areas, while the TLD shows how ongoing dialogue between legislative bodies can benefit to relationship-building even when legislative effects are limited or that tensions arise.

The TLD: an Ancient People-to-People Dialogue with Few Power

The first dialogue between the EP and the US Congress took place in 1972 (Blanc, 2018), but the TLD in its actual form was only formally established during the 50th interparliamentary meeting in January 1999 to strengthen transatlantic parliamentary ties and to answer the frustration within the EP over the slow progress of transatlantic cooperation and institutionalization (Jančić, 2014; Dunne, 2023). It serves as a dialogue forum between Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and members of the US Congress, mostly of the House of Representatives (HR). While relatively unknown, it plays a key role to embody the spirit of “equality” and cooperation between the two legislative entities (Jančić, 2023).

The TLD members meet twice a year, alternating between sessions in the US and Europe, and organize formal sessions and informal activities like dinners and visits. These meetings culminate in a joint declaration summarizing the discussions. Despite the low level of institutionalization, meaning that it doesn't have a permanent body, it is valued for the quality of the talks to improve mutual understanding, driven by shared political and cultural values (Blanc, 2023a). According to the *1999 Joint Declaration*, the TLD aims to improve transatlantic dialogues between European and American legislators. Benefiting from the privileged positions of both assemblies, it seeks to enhance democratic oversight of transatlantic relations and improve the mutual knowledge of their respective legislation (European Parliament, 1999). However, it avoids promises of direct legislative involvement and is rather considered as a subsidiary diplomatic channel for legislators to discuss the political outcomes of transatlantic meetings between the executives or events that affect transatlantic relations. It also serves to emphasize the strength of transatlantic ties and shared values (Lazarou, 2020; Jančić, 2023). The TLD is also a way for MEPs to seek recognition and project the EP's or EU's relevance to their American counterpart. Indeed, while they are formally equal, it is acknowledged that Congress members tend not to view MEPs as their equals. Thus, dialogues provide them with an opportunity to assert their relevance as transatlantic partners and turn the exchange into a performance (Blanc, 2023a). Commitment to the forum is also asymmetrical, with the EP demonstrating a stronger level of engagement. Indeed, MEPs usually take the lead in organizing meetings, shaping the agenda, and unlike US Congress, they have a dedicated

interparliamentary group for US relations and a permanent liaison office in Washington, D.C., to maintain contact with Congress members (Dunne, 2023; Jančić, 2023).

During the talks, human rights are usually an area of convergence and are often used to highlight the value-based transatlantic bond (Lazarou, 2020). By contrast, trade and economic issues are more complex and controversial. The parliamentary cooperation system itself is relatively stable, even during periods of political tensions, since legislators tend to act as mediators to foster mutual understanding, build trust and diffuse misperceptions (Lazarou, 2020; Dunne, 2023). However, the forum suffers from a lack of visibility and of a shared consensus from both sides regarding the future of the TLD. While MEPs favor the creation of a permanent body, members of the US Congress disregard the idea. Other ideological and practical differences add further challenges. For example, the US Congress prefers light regulation to foster economic growth while the EP advocates for a regulated market economy. Moreover, while the EP tends to anticipate future issues with its legislation, the US Congress is prone to legislate in reaction to them (Jančić, 2015; 2023; Fahey, 2024).

The TTC: A New High-Level Political Dialogue to Talk About Modern Challenges

The TTC was established during the EU-US summit of June 2021, following an earlier proposal of the EC in 2020 which was initially rejected by the Trump administration (European Commission, 2020; European Parliament, 2021a). The EC aimed to initiate a joint value-based response with the US to the rise of alternative models of regulation, such as concerns over digital sovereignty, by fostering high-level dialogue on key economic and technological challenges (European Commission, 2021a). However, it is not a negotiation forum, as it operates through informal agreements and soft law. Thus, even though it has general goals, it does not aim for a formal treaty or targeted outcomes, thereby avoiding the ratification challenges seen with the TTIP (O'Sullivan, 2023; Jančić, 2023) and mainly serves as a dialogue channel. Its structure involves meetings every six months, leading to frequent diplomatic activity and numerous incremental announcements or declarations (Lilkov et al., 2024). The European Commissioner for Competition and Trade represents the EU, while the US is represented by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, or the Trade Representative. It is structured around ten working groups focusing on technology-related themes from a security or competition perspective. These groups are meant to implement decisions made during political meetings (European Commission, 2021a).

The TTC general objectives focus on deepening trade and investment dialogue while preventing new technical barriers. It addresses issues such as digital sovereignty, AI regulation, supply chain mapping, or technological standards (Aktoudianakis et al., 2021). The EU's main

goal with the TTC is mainly to promote a “values-based digital transformation” in line with its foreign policy strategy and the so-called “Brussels effect”, referring to its ability to shape regulatory practices beyond its borders (Bendiek & Stürzer, 2022). For the US, the focus is on re-establishing high-level dialogues to advance their interests and to counter China’s growing influence (Bown & Malmström, 2021). Some have expressed frustration with the TTC’s lack of ambition due to its absence of concrete goals, deadlines, and engagement with divisive issues (Chase, 2021). Yet, the choice for this kind of approach was intentional since it can facilitate dialogue while sidestepping sensitive issues (Lilkov et al., 2024).

Methodology

Evaluating the effectiveness of a dialogue forum is, by nature, a relatively complex exercise. Indeed, the outcomes of such processes most often result in general statements and commitments in principle, but very rarely in concrete and binding agreements. This is due to their limited primary objective which is to initiate a constructive dialogue among partners. Based on that premise, one option to measure the success of these dialogues could depend primarily on their ability to maintain over time a space for discussion among partners; thus this article hypothesizes that the effectiveness of a forum can be measured through the nature of the topics that actors agree to place on the agenda and on how they manage to do it. As we saw earlier, these forums tend to operate under mandates that are both restrictive and flexible, allowing the agenda to evolve in some context. Thus, three criteria will be considered. First, the forum’s capacity to address emerging transatlantic issues, especially those arising from crises or significant contextual shifts. Second, the way in which topics discussed evolve from one session to another. Third, the degree of alignment around common positions among actors. These criteria will be assessed through a content analysis of the documents produced by the forums (joint statements and press releases) in order to identify the topics discussed and track their evolution over time. This will shed light on the persistence, emergence, or disappearance of specific issues from one session to another, thus revealing the forum’s responsiveness to crises or contextual changes. The alignment of positions among actors will be evaluated by analyzing the formulation of shared positions and the use of common language. Additionally, expert insights into the conduct of the discussions will be incorporated to assess the fluidity and ease of the dialogue.

The analysis focuses on the TLD and the TTC between 2021 and 2024 to allow for a comparative assessment of both forums. This timeframe is particularly relevant, first because the TTC was only established in 2021, and more importantly because it marks the first instance, since the suspension of the TTIP negotiations, in which both sides of the Atlantic have

expressed a renewed commitment to strengthening cooperation through a structured dialogue without the aim of reaching a binding legal agreement.

Main Debates and Themes for the Transatlantic Dialogue from 2021 to 2024

The following sections will develop and relate the result of the analysis of both fora according to the methodology.

Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD) between 2021 and 2024:

Following the election of Joe Biden, the EP adopted a resolution on EU-US relations, advocating for more institutionalized cooperation by renewing its long-standing demand to transform the TLD into a formal entity with permanent members (EP Resolution on the Future of EU-US Relations, 2021). Yet, legislative proposals in the HR pursuing this were rejected and congressmen have largely been unreceptive to this suggestion (Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue Act, 2022). Nevertheless, the growing numbers of fragmented legislative response to global challenges have heightened parliamentarians' shared sense of the need to deepen their mutual understanding of each other' approach (Dunne, 2023). As a result, interparliamentary contacts have intensified outside of the TLD with the pandemic prompting an increase of informal virtual parliamentary meetings and legislative exchanges, which introduced the continuity of contact the EP had wished for despite no physical meetings were held between 2020 and 2022 (Dunne, 2023). Furthermore, the Co-Chairs of the TLD have held several meetings and issued joint statements on events that impacted transatlantic relation like the creation of the TTC or Russia's invasion of Ukraine (European Parliament, 2021b; 2022a). However, although those statements have tried to highlights how EU and US legislators articulate a shared political position, there is a lack of mutual coordination that could enhance their efforts and calls into effectiveness (Jančić, 2023).

From May 2022 to April 2024, five meetings between the European Parliament and the US Congress (the HR) were organized, systematically addressing a series of recurring themes (European Parliament, 2022a; 2022b; 2023a, 2023b, 2024).

First was the shared importance that both parties place on values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law, mostly in the context of transatlantic support for Ukraine, highlighting the legislators' commitment to maintain a united ideological stance against the rise of global authoritarianism and illiberal governments. Such value-driven statements were frequently paired with geopolitical concerns, including energy security, economic considerations, disinformation campaigns and foreign interference ahead of the 2024 elections. The latter topic being a persistent issue during the talks.

A second key theme was support for Ukraine. The war has dominated talks on energy, defense, sanctions, and transatlantic solidarity. The meetings not only emphasized the need for continued assistance to Ukraine but also framed the conflict as a struggle between democratic and authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, there were consistent calls to push for greater transatlantic defense cooperation, particularly on sharing information on their respective sanction or legislation toward Russia and Belarus. Occasionally, talks about the expansion of NATO to Sweden and Finland or the broader European defense strategy were discussed.

Economic security and technological collaboration form the third focal point of these meetings, particularly on data governance, technology standards, and securing critical supply chains. In these fields, parliamentarians recognized the importance of the TTC to advance those matters and called for greater institutionalization of the forum and for incorporating the TLD as well as other primary actors into the general talks. Regulating AI in ways that align with democratic values was often discussed especially about the risks of AI misuse. The meetings also covered tensions, such as US concerns about European laws, though to discriminate against US trade interests, and IRA-related tensions, seen as affecting the competitiveness of European firms. Both parties also acknowledge that the current configuration of global trade rules, including the ones from WTO, is outdated and ill-equipped to address modern challenges and that reform are thus needed. Another persistent issue was the question of supply chain security, particularly in sectors like semiconductors and pharmaceuticals.

The last major issues were energy security and climate action. The first was constantly associated with the war in Ukraine or global climate commitment and was focused on the need to move away from reliance on Russian energy and to secure energy supplies. The second, particularly after the COP27 summit, was framed as part of a wider transatlantic challenge. Considering energy shortages and climate goals discussions focused on the need to accelerate the transition to reliable and sustainable energy providers, both technologically and politically.

Discussion on the achievements and limitations of the TLD

Applying the proposed methodology to assess the effectiveness of the TLD between 2021 and 2024 reveals a notably weak performance.

On one positive note, the TLD has demonstrated a degree of responsiveness to global and transatlantic developments, including key issues in the dialog such as the war in Ukraine, comments on the deliberations within the TTC, energy security in Europe, disinformation, geopolitical tensions, and regulatory changes on both sides of the Atlantic. The conflict in Ukraine, in particular, became a focal point, prompting expressions of support for Kyiv and discussions on transatlantic sanctions, defense cooperation, and NATO enlargement. However,

this thematic adaptability is constrained by the forum’s structural limitations, which will be examined in the following sections.

Over the period under review, the TLD’s agenda evolved incrementally rather than fundamentally. While new topics such as technological cooperation and regulation, vulnerabilities in global supply chains, and climate-related challenges were integrated into the agenda, the TLD’s has however consistently preferred to focus on familiar themes like “shared values”, including democracy and human rights (Lazarou, 2020). This focus has sometimes led to a sense of redundancy and limited innovation resulting from these discussions. If the repeated emphasis on long-standing issues reflects their importance for the legislators, it also fostered a sense of stagnation and repetition of the agenda. Despite consistent calls from the European Parliament to formalize the TLD’s structure (EP Resolution, 2021), it remains an informal body. This lack of institutionalization significantly hampers its capacity to implement initiatives and sustain policy momentum between sessions. Moreover, in the agenda, the TLD has struggled to engage meaningfully in discussions about areas of transatlantic divergence, such as US opposition to aspects of EU digital market regulation and European concerns over the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Though these tensions were discussed (Young, 2023), they were largely handled through cautious rhetoric rather than structured dialogue aimed at resolution. Finally, the fact that the TLD is now addressing issues such as NATO expansion and European defense, topics that are clearly outside the scope of the US-EU bilateral relationship, demonstrates that the agenda is being used to discuss matters that preoccupy legislators, even when there is no intention of producing concrete outcomes from it.

The joint statements issued during this period reflect partial rhetorical alignment on democratic values, on support for Ukraine, and on the importance of transatlantic cooperation in defense, technology, and trade. While these declarations employed common language and signaled shared intent, they largely remained symbolic. Without institutional backing and effective follow-up mechanisms, this rhetorical alignment reveals a persistent gap between discourse and action. In this context, the absence of a formal framework prevents the TLD from becoming a substantive driver of transatlantic convergence or from fulfilling its intended role in overseeing transatlantic cooperation. This reinforces the perception of the TLD as a space for building convergence on non-contentious issues, rather than a venue for addressing complex disagreements.

Historically, the TLD has been recognized for sustaining dialogue between legislators, particularly during periods of political strains, such as under the Trump administration, and in the context of the TTIP negotiations, where it offered a venue for discussing technical and

procedural challenges (Blanc, 2023b; Lazarou, 2020; Jančić, 2016; Bricart, 2021). However, during the 2021-2024 period, characterized by political tension but not outright confrontation and lacking a formal treaty framework to monitor, the TLD has appeared limited in scope. Similarly, the TTC informal nature has limited the ability of the TLD to oversee its initiatives. Furthermore, while virtual meetings have helped maintain continuity and increased the frequency of contact between legislators during the pandemic while the official meetings were suspended, they have also raised questions about the overall added value of the TLD. Furthermore, emerging literature suggests that the European Parliament's delegation to the US Congress in Washington may be assuming a more significant role in maintaining transatlantic dialogue between legislators (Dune, 2023). Therefore, unless the transatlantic context undergoes substantial change, or the TLD itself is institutionalized or more closely integrated with broader frameworks of a transatlantic forum such as the TTC, it is likely to remain a platform for symbolic affirmation of shared political commitments between legislator rather than a catalyst for concrete legislative convergence.

The Trade and Technology Council (TTC) Between 2021 and 2024

The first six TTC meetings, spanning from 2021 to 2024, were aimed to strengthen US-EU ties and coordination on trade, new technology, and global challenges. However, each TTC meeting has taken place amid shifting geopolitical, economic, and domestic context spanning from the COVID-19 and trade disputes, to the Ukraine crisis and industrial policy tensions (Lilkov et al., 2024). Each meeting adapting its agenda to address some, but far from all, issues while with keeping a focus on emerging technologies, economic security, and sustainability.

The inaugural meeting started with low expectations. The COVID-19 pandemic was still disrupting economies, political trust between the US and EU were strained by the AUKUS submarine deal (Euractiv, 2021), and the Trump-era tariffs on European steel and aluminium were still unresolved. Thus, sensitive topics like data protection were stepped aside to avoid derailing discussions (Chase, 2021). By the time of the second meeting, Russia's invasion of Ukraine dramatically reshaped the agenda and realigned transatlantic priorities (Pollet, 2022). The third meeting was marked by tensions over the IRA, which prompted a boycott of the meeting by the EU's main representative (Stokes et al., 2024). The fourth meeting saw some easing of tensions after the US moved to accommodate European concerns, but Ukraine continued to loom large during the talks. The fifth meeting, which was postponed a first time, amid crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, ended without a joint declaration as disputes over the non-permanent suspension of US tariffs and the EU's new carbon border tax exacerbated

mutual frustration. For the sixth and last TTC meeting, political uncertainty ahead of the future elections in both the US and the EU raised question over the future of the TTC (Bertolini, 2024).

Despite the recurrent influence of the context on the easing of the talks, technological cooperation and the harmonization of standards for emerging technologies were the main recurring topic especially talks about AI (European Commission, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024a, 2024b; US Department of Commerce, 2022). During the first three meetings, discussions focused on developing reliable AI systems respecting human rights, while at the same time both sides were working on harmonizing AI terminology and common frameworks for international standards. Significant regulatory divergences persisted, however, especially regarding AI, data protection, and sustainability, as the EU's more stringent regulatory approach, as embodied in the *Digital Markets Act* and *AI Act*, often contrasted with the US's preference for voluntary or market-driven solutions. Furthermore, supply chain resilience, particularly regarding semiconductors, became an increasing recurring concern following the war in Ukraine and across most of the meetings as both sides tried and worked on the possibility to align semiconductor laws and subsidies to secure supply chains and address shortages, but tangible outcomes remained limited (European Parliament, 2023c). The last two meetings emphasized more on forward-looking technologies and on building a joint roadmap for 6G, which was established along with a working group on quantum technologies. However, the practical impact of the six meetings and of the working groups remains limited since even though they have allowed both parts to engage in broad commitments on several technical issues and procured some advancements from one summit to the other, they often lacked specific definitive agreements.

A second recurring theme was climate subsidies and sustainability. Indeed, sustainable trade practices and green technology have been a recurring topic discussed since the very first meeting. This included the talks about developing eco-friendly supply chains, securing critical minerals, and collaborating on electric vehicle battery technologies. The fourth meeting particularly focused on those themes. However, this was an exception. Indeed, the topic was heavily impacted by the international context and political tensions. For example, it was a minor topic in the meeting that took place after the beginning of the war in Ukraine. For the third meeting tensions related to US legislation, specifically the adoption of the IRA, described as “the elephant in the room” (Lilkov et al., 2024), affected the ease of the transatlantic dialogue even though it was not the TTC purpose to address the issue. Finally, no significant commitments were made during the latest summits. To this day, alignment of transatlantic climate policies remains very limited and challenging. The lack of common stances, the

difficulty to maintain the topic on the agenda, tensions over green subsidies, and the ease with which the context influence the talks all demonstrate the difficulty of converting political dialogue into actionable outcomes in this area.

The third recurrent topic was geopolitical and strategic cooperation. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 reshaped the agenda of the TTC, with the second meeting focusing on talks about sanction coordination, particularly concerning critical and dual used technology exports to Russia and Belarus. It illustrated the evolving role of the TTC as a forum to discuss alignment of transatlantic sanctions policies and broader geopolitical responses, but also quickly revealed its limitations as a decision-making body since most of the major decision regarding those issues largely occurred outside the TTC framework. It was mostly used to discuss technical issues that needed to be resolved in order to implement restrictions on exports of critical and dual-use technologies (Van Elsuwege & Szép, 2023; Lilkov et al., 2024). China was also a backdrop to many discussions, especially concerning trade practices, critical minerals, and technology dominance. While China itself was rarely mentioned in Joint-Declarations, talks during the meetings, especially during the fourth, reflected growing transatlantic concern about Chinese influence, particularly in critical supply chains, and wish to see it directly addressed in the talks. However, Europe's reluctance to adopt an explicit US-style "decoupling" strategy, given Germany's economic ties to China especially in car export, highlighted ongoing divisions in strategy. There was, however, a consensus to talk about "de-risking" rather than "decoupling" from China, even though substantial agreements were lacking. Furthermore, defense and economic security's issues were added to the TTC's strategic objectives to address economic coercion by authoritarian states, to reduce vulnerabilities and promote economic resilience. All of these aligned with the broader transatlantic efforts to counterbalance Chinese and Russian influences, but they represented more of a complementary approach to parallel policies rather than new initiatives.

Discussion on the achievements and limitations of the TTC

The six meetings of the TTC provided a relevant case study for evaluating the effectiveness of a dialogue forum using the proposed methodological framework.

The first criterion, the forum's capacity to address emerging issues, is only partially met. The TTC demonstrated significant adaptability by reshaping its agenda in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, showing that it was capable of integrating urgent and cross-cutting issues into its deliberations. This was also the case for issues like the struggle against disinformation campaigns from other states. However, this capacity remained selective. Many contentious issues that occurred during the period studied such as economic, trade, and industrial policies,

including US concerns over the EU's regulations, or the EU's worries about the impact of IRA on the European market, were delegated to other bilateral forums even though they were impacting the fluidity of the talks (Bertani, 2022). In addition, important political decisions that reflected the new transatlantic political alignment relative to the war in Ukraine such as the imposition or implementation of joint sanctions or financial aid were taken outside of the TTC framework (Van Elsuwege & Szép, 2023). Furthermore, the issues that were discussed, such as enforcing export controls and securing supply chains, were areas that often fell outside the scope of the TTC's working groups while overshadowing issues such as tech regulation and green transition. Ultimately, the TTC appears to have struggled with, rather than resolve, emerging geopolitical and economic conflicts. It confirms that the broader health of US-EU relations heavily influences the ease and effectiveness of discussions within such forums (Blanc, 2018).

The second criterion concerns the evolution of the original topics discussed or put in the agenda from one session to the next, which reveals both continuity and flexibility from one part, and inconsistency and disagreement for the other. Core themes such as cooperation on emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, supply chain resilience (especially in semiconductors), and coordination on tech standards remained central in the agenda across all six meetings with some evolution in the way to address them. The forum also tried to display a roadmap for 6G and launch working groups on quantum technologies. However, other topics such as climate, energy or critical mineral policy and sustainability were treated inconsistently. While briefly prioritized during one meeting, these topics were often overshadowed by more immediate geopolitical tensions. Their sporadic presence underscores the challenge of keeping certain issues on the agenda when transatlantic attention is dominated by geopolitical crises.

The third criterion, measuring alignment around common positions, exposes some of the TTC's structural limitations. While there was broad rhetorical agreement on the key priorities that needed to be discussed and while the official communication of the forum emphasized cooperation, coordination, and information sharing between the transatlantic actors, the real exchanges within it have often confirmed divergence rather than produced convergence. Some meetings ended without joint declarations, and progress often took the form of simple declarations, recommendations, roadmaps, minor agreements on standard and on a shared taxonomy. One notable exception is the adoption of a common standard for heavy truck charging ports (Fletcher, 2023). This reinforces the view that transatlantic regulatory divergences remain far from being resolved or harmonized (Young, 2023). Persistent challenges in US-EU relation, such as US protectionist policies and green subsidies,

disagreements over AI regulation, further underscore the complexity of achieving a comprehensive alignment. Furthermore, the adoption of compromise language, such as the use of “de-risking” instead of “decoupling” in discussions on China, reflects efforts to maintain apparent cohesion while masking deeper strategic divergences.

Thus, applying the chosen methodology to the TTC shows that while the forum has succeeded in preserving a structured and adaptive space for dialogue, its effectiveness remains very limited. The TTC has proved responsive to some external global shifts and capable of fostering repeated exchanges on critical issues, yet it struggles to produce lasting agreements or harmonized policies. These modest achievements should not be dismissed as failures since they reinforce the notion that the value of such forums lies not in the production of binding commitments, but rather in their ability to sustain engagement by enabling both the EU and the US to express their intentions and familiarize themselves with each other’s regulatory objectives. The TTC ensures continued engagement even amid persistent disagreements and international shift. As Lilkov et al. (2024, p. 16) aptly note, “*The best a TTC-like format can hope to achieve is to encourage discussion*”, since most political actions take place outside the organization’s framework.

Comparative Table: Achievements and Limitations of the TLD and TTC (2021–2024)

Criteria	Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD)	Trade and Technology Council (TTC)
Nature	Interparliamentary people-to-people forum	High-level political forum
Adaptability to emerging issues	Moderate: included Ukraine, climate, digital regulation but cautious rhetoric on sensitive issues	High but selective: quick to address Ukraine, slow on IRA, digital market act, etc.
Concrete outcomes	Limited to symbolic statements	Some technical advances (e.g., standardization and taxonomy), but limited
Capacity to address disagreements	Low: tends to avoid contentious topics	Low: contentious issues diverted to other forums, but still impact the talks
Impact on transatlantic convergence	Low: convergence on values and topics to discuss, no direct legislative influence	Low: vocabulary alignment, common standardization on few tech issues, but persistent divergences on climate and IA regulation
Primary value	Maintaining legislative ties, symbolic affirmation of transatlantic bond	Sustain engagement, strategic policy dialogue and mutual understanding
Main limitations	Lack of formalization, repetitive agenda, weak follow-up	Lack of ambition, heavily affected by political context

Conclusion

In conclusion, the institutionalization of dialogues between the EU and the US through forums such as the *Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue* and the *Trade and Technology Council* constitutes a meaningful step in maintaining structured transatlantic diplomatic exchange. They provide valuable opportunities to engage in an increasingly complex range of common international issues such as digital trade, technology regulation, energy security, and other areas of mutual interest.

Notwithstanding these encouraging developments, it is essential to remain aware of the inherent limitations of these fora. Their institutional designs reflect their true mandate which is not to produce binding decisions or vastly shape legislation and norms, but to serve as arenas for dialogue, trust building, and mutual understanding. The TLD, while fostering regular exchanges between legislators, operates primarily as a symbolic space providing an area for dialogue for legislators to reaffirm the transatlantic bond, rather than having a direct influence on the legislative processes of the EP and the US Congress or to the development of concrete policies. At the same time, the TTC first aim was to re-established formal discussions on strategic technological and trade issues, and it has succeeded in doing so, but has also struggled to produce enforceable, tangible results. Its progress has mostly been limited to broad declarations of intent, rather than policy changes or concrete action.

In addition, due to their very nature, TTC's and TLD's participants are reluctant to put on the agenda contentious geopolitical and economic issues. Their tendency to be impacted by external political tensions during the talks also highlights the difficulty for them to act according to their mandate efficiently. A significant obstacle to a deeper cooperation in the conduct of these institutional frameworks remains the regulatory approach divergences between the EU and the US. Areas like data protection, economic policy, and energy transition illustrate a fundamental divide: the EU's more stringent, precautionary regulatory stance contrasts sharply with the US's more liberal, market-oriented approach. Still, dismissing these dialogues on the basis of their limited decisional power would overlook their broader strategic value. In a context of growing geopolitical instability and fragmentation, the TLD and TTC, as well as other fora and transatlantic talking groups, ensure that the dialogues between the EU and the US proceed and that talks remain open and resilient in spite of political tensions.

Can institutionalized platforms like the TTC and the TLD really enable the EU and the US to jointly reassert their leadership in global standard-setting? While the article has demonstrated that their influence on global governance remains modest, their role in reinforcing transatlantic dialogue should not be underestimated. These platforms offer both sides the opportunity to address the challenges that arise, and to improve mutual understanding at different levels of

power. Their ability to stimulate discussions is essential, not only to consider the resolution of the immediate problems they might face, but also to lay the foundations of mutual trust that can lead to shared consensus on more complex issues. Thus, their capacity to support long-term understanding and gradual convergence is crucial, not as a substitute for formal diplomacy or regulatory alignment, but as a complement to these efforts.

With consistent political backing and a shared commitment to cooperation, these platforms could continue to adapt incrementally to emerging challenges. Their success, however, will depend less on their ability to deliver immediate, transformative outcomes than on their continued relevance as mechanisms for dialogue and mutual reassurance, especially in light of the shifting political dynamics the transatlantic relation faces with the return of Donald Trump. In this regard, the resilience of these fora will be measured not by the binding decisions they produce, but by their capacity to sustain engagement and provide continuity in an evolving and often unpredictable international environment.

Bibliography

- ABBOT K. W., & SNIDAL D., 'Hard and Soft Law in International Governance', *International Organization*, 2000, vol. 54, n° 3, pp. 421–456.
- AKTOUDIANAKIS A., VAN DER LOO G., & VANDENBUSSCHE T., *The EU-US Trade and Technology Council: Mapping the Challenges and Opportunities for Transatlantic Cooperation on Trade, Climate, and Digital*, Egmont Institute, 2021, n° 113, pp. 1–17.
- BELTON K. B., & GRAHAM J. D., 'Trump's deregulation record: Is it working?', *Administrative Law Review*, 2019, vol. 71, n° 4, pp. 803–880.
- BENDIEK A., & STÜRZER I., *Advancing European internal and external digital sovereignty: The Brussels effect and the EU-US Trade and Technology Council*, Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik, 2022, n° 20, pp. 1–8.
- BERTANI G., 'The Transatlantic Economy: From the Tariff War to the Trade and Technology Council', *Institute for a Greater Europe*, September 1, 2022, available at: <https://institutegreatoreurope.com/studies-teams/the-transatlantic-economy-from-the-tariff-war-to-the-trade-and-technology-council/> (accessed October 30, 2024).
- BERTOLINI M., 'EU-US Trade and Technology Council: The Last Hurrah?', *Center for European Policy Analysis*, 9 avril 2024, available at: <https://cepa.org/article/eu-us-trade-and-technology-council-the-last-hurrah/> (Accessed November 4, 2024).
- BLANC E., 'Recognition through dialogue: How transatlantic relations anchor the EU's identity', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 2023a, vol. 25, n° 1, pp. 102–120.
- BLANC E., 'Transatlantic Diplomacy in the Age of Populism: A Story of Resilience?', in LACATUS C., MEIBAUER G., & LÖFFLMANN G. (EDS.), *Political Communication and Performative Leadership*, 1re éd., Springer International Publishing, 2023b, pp. 299–315.
- BLANC E., *The EU in quest for the recognition of its institutional identity: The case of the EU-US dialogues*, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2018, , available at: <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3784/>
- BOSSE-PLATIÈRE I., & RAPOPORT C. (EDS.), *The Conclusion and Implementation of EU Free Trade Agreements: Constitutional Challenges*, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019.
- BOWN C., & MALMSTRÖM C., 'What is the US-EU Trade and Technology Council? Five things you need to know', *Peterson Institute for International Economics*, 24 septembre 2021, available at: <https://www.piie.com/blogs/tradeand-investment-policy-watch/what-us-eu-trade-and-technology-council-five-things-you-need> (Accessed July 26, 2024).
- BRICART V., 'L'Amérique a-t-elle dépassé les bornes ? L'impact de l'administration Trump sur la relation entre les États-Unis et l'Union européenne', *Revue de la Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Liège*, 2022, n° 3, pp. 525–551.

- BRICART V., 'Politique commerciale extérieure: Quel rôle pour les assemblées parlementaires ? Le cas des États-Unis et de l'Union Européenne', *Cahiers de Science Politique de l'Université de Liège*, numéro spécial, 2021, pp. 1–26.
- CHASE P., 'Reframing and Energizing Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation', *RED*, 2021, vol. 3, n° 2, pp. 85–90.
- DIMITROVA A., *The State of the Transatlantic Relationship in the Trump Era*, Robert Schuman Foundation, 2020, n° 545, pp. 1–6.
- DUNNE J., 'Connecting the US Congress and the European Parliament', in FAHEY E. (ED.), *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Relations*, 1re éd., Routledge, 2023, pp. 17–30.
- ELGSTRÖM O., 'Outsiders' Perceptions of the European Union in International Trade Negotiations', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2007, vol. 45, n° 4, pp. 949–967.
- EU-US PRIVACY SHIELD, 2016.
- EURACTIV, 'EU says US tech talks going ahead despite French anger', *Euractiv*, 23 septembre 2021, available at : <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-says-us-tech-talks-going-ahead-despite-french-anger/> (Accessed November 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 'EU and US take stock of trade and technology cooperation', 2024a, disponible à l'adresse suivante : https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_575 (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 'EU-US launch Trade and Technology Council to lead values-based global digital transformation', 2021a, available at : https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_21_2990/IP_21_2990_EN.pdf (consultée le 4 décembre 2024).
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 'EU-US Trade and Technology Council Inaugural Joint Statement', 2021b, available at : https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/statement_21_4951/STATEMENT_21_4951_EN.pdf (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 'Joint statement of the Trade and Technology Council', 2022, available at : https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_7516 (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 'Joint statement of the Trade and Technology Council', 2023, available at : https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_2992 (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 'Joint statement of the Trade and Technology Council', 2024b, available at : https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_24_1828 (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION, *Joint Communication: A new EU-US agenda for global change*, European Commission, 2020, available at : https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/da473743-1205-45c3-a558-87d0bf356cbd_en?filename=joint-communication-eu-us-agenda_en.pdf&prefLang=fr (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, '84th Transatlantic legislators' dialogue (TLD): EU-US Joint statement', *European Parliament*, 2022a, available at : <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/248961/84th%20Transatlantic%20Legislators%20Dialogue%20-%20EU-US%20IPM%20-%20Joint%20Statement%20-%202022%20May%202022%20-%20SIGNED.pdf> (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, '85th EU-US Transatlantic legislators' dialogue (TLD) final joint statement', *European Parliament*, 2022b, available at : <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/260653/85th%20eu-us%20tld%20final%20joint%20statement%20signed.pdf> (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, '86th Transatlantic legislators' dialogue (TLD) joint statement', *European Parliament*, 2023a, available at : <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/272161/Joint%20Statement%20-%2086thTLD%20Stockholm%20-%202017-06-2023.pdf> (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, '87th Transatlantic legislators' dialogue (TLD) joint statement', *European Parliament*, 2023b, available at : <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/279643/Joint%20Statement%20-%2087th%20TLD%20-%20Washington%20DC%201%20Dec%20202> (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, '88th Transatlantic legislators' dialogue (TLD) joint statement', *European Parliament*, 2024, available at : https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/282103/Signed_statement_88th_TLD.pdf (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 'EU-US Trade and Technology Council: New forum for transatlantic cooperation', *European Parliament*, 2021a, available at : [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI\(2021\)698037](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2021)698037) (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 'Joint statement on the establishment of the TLD', *European Parliament*, 1999, available at : <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/tld/en/about/overview> (Accessed October 15, 2024).

- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 'Transatlantic legislators' dialogue (TLD) co-chairs' statement', *European Parliament*, 2021b, available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/236983/20210618-TLD%20co-chairs%20statement.pdf> (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 'Transatlantic legislators' dialogue (TLD) co-chairs' statement on Russian invasion', *European Parliament*, 2022c, available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/245326/TLD%20Co-Chairs%20statement%20on%20Russian%20invasion%20Feb%202022.pdf> (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 'Transatlantic legislators' dialogue (TLD) statement on the Trade and Technology Council', *European Parliament*, 2021c, available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/240101/20210929-TLD%20statement%20on%20TTC.pdf> (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, *The EU-US Trade and Technology Council: Modest Progress In A Challenging Context*, European Parliament Research Service (EPRS), 2023c, available at: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/739336/EPRS_BRI\(2023\)739336_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/739336/EPRS_BRI(2023)739336_EN.pdf) (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- EVENETT S. J., & STERN R. M. (EDS.), *Systemic implications of transatlantic regulatory cooperation and competition*, World Scientific, 2011.
- FAHEY E., 'Law and Governance as Checks and Balances in Transatlantic Security: Rights, Redress, and Remedies in EU-US Passenger Name Records and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program', *Yearbook of European Law*, 2013, vol. 32, n° 1, pp. 368–388.
- FAHEY E., 'The EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council: Shifting Multilateralism Through Bilateralism and Institutions?', in QUIRICO O., & KWAPISZ WILLIAMS K. (EDS.), *The European Union and the Evolving Architectures of International Economic Agreements*, Springer Nature Singapore, 2023, pp. 171–181.
- FAHEY E., & TERPAN F., 'Torn Between Institutionalisation & Judicialisation: The Demise of the EU-US Privacy Shield', *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 2021, vol. 28, n° 2, pp. 205–244.
- FAHEY E., *Chapter 11 Democratic Leadership through Transatlantic Cooperation for Trade and Technology Reforms through the EU-US TTC Model?*, Brill | Nijhoff, 2024, pp. 279–307.
- FIERKE K. M., 'Dialogues of Manoeuvre and Entanglement: NATO, Russia, and the CEECs', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1999, vol. 28, n° 1, pp. 27–52.
- FLETCHER N., 'US, EU Agree on Heavy-Truck Charging Standard', *Transport Topics*, 31 mai 2023, available at: <https://www.ttnews.com/articles/us-eu-truck-charging> (Accessed November 22, 2024).
- FRAMEWORK FOR ADVANCING TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (TEC) BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 2007, available at: <https://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/europe/0704useusummit.pdf> (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- GARDNER A., 'From the Transatlantic Declaration to the NTA: The Shaping of Institutional Mechanisms and Policy Objectives by National and Supranational Actors', in PHILIPPART E & WINAND P. (EDS.), *Ever Closer Partnership: Policy-Making in US-EU Relations*, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2001, pp. 83–106.
- GARDNER A., *Stars with stripes: The essential partnership between the European Union and the United States*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.
- HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 5376: *Inflation Reduction Act of 2022*, 2022.
- HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 6624: *Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue Act*, 2022.
- JANČIĆ D., 'The European Parliament and EU-US relations—Revamping institutional cooperation?', in FAHEY E., & CURTIN D. (EDS.), *A Transatlantic Community of Law—Legal Perspectives on the Relationship Between the EU and US Legal Orders*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 35–68.
- JANČIĆ D., 'The Role of the European Parliament and the US Congress in Shaping Transatlantic Relations: TTIP, NSA Surveillance, and CIA Renditions', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2016, vol. 54, n° 4, pp. 896–912.
- JANČIĆ D., 'Transatlantic Parliamentary Cooperation at Fifty', in FAHEY E. (EDS.), *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Relations*, 1re éd., Routledge, 2023, pp. 52–66.
- JANČIĆ D., 'Transatlantic Regulatory Interdependence, Law and Governance: The Evolving Roles of the EU and US Legislatures', *Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies*, 2015, vol. 17, pp. 334–359.
- KEOHANE R. O., *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton University Press, 1984.
- KEOHANE R. O., 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly*, 1988, vol. 32, n° 4, p. 379.
- KRASNER S. D., 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', *International Organization*, 1982, vol. 36, n° 2, pp. 185–205.

- LAZAROU E., 'Chapter 4: Transatlantic Parliamentary Diplomacy', in EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES & SOARE S., *Turning the Tide: How to Rescue Transatlantic Relations*, Publications Office, 2020, pp. 60–74.
- LEBLANC-WOHRER M., 'Le droit, arme économique et géopolitique des États-Unis', *Politique Étrangère*, 2019, Hiver, n° 4, pp. 37–48.
- LILKOV D., RIEDENSTEIN C. & ECHIKSON B., 'Transatlantic Trade and Technology: Partners or Rivals?', *Center for European Policy Analysis*, 2024, pp. 1–28.
- MANNERS I., 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2002, vol. 40, n° 2, pp. 235–258.
- MATHIS J., 'Addressing Transatlantic Regulatory Barriers: Can the USA and the EU Create an Effective Equivalency Instrument?', in FAHEY E. & CURTIN D. (EDS.), *A Transatlantic Community of Law*, 1re éd., Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 186–209.
- MAYR S., 'CETA, TTIP, TiSA, and Their Relationship with EU Law', in GRILLER S., OBWEXER W. & VRANES E. (EDS.), *Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: CETA, TTIP, and TiSA: New Orientations for EU External Economic Relations*, Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 246–278.
- MONAR J., 'The Rejection of the EU-US SWIFT Interim Agreement by the European Parliament: A Historic Vote and Its Implications', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2010, vol. 15, n° 2, pp. 143–151.
- NUNES I. F., 'Civilian, Normative, and Ethical Power Europe: Role Claims and EU Discourses', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2011, vol. 16, n° 1, pp. 1–20.
- NYE J. S., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, Basic Books, 1990.
- O'SULLIVAN D., 'EU-US Relations in a Changing World', in FAHEY E. (EDS.), *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Relations*, 1re éd., Routledge, 2023, pp. 31–37.
- P9_TA(2021)041, 'European Parliament Resolution of 6 October 2021 on the Future of EU-US Relations', 2021.
- PETERSMANN E.-U., 'Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade Agreements without Rights and Remedies of Citizens?', *Journal of International Economic Law*, 2015, vol. 18, n° 3, pp. 579–607.
- POLLACK M. & SHAFFER G., 'Transatlantic Governance in a Global Economy: Historical and Theoretical Perspective', in POLLACK M. & SHAFFER G. (EDS.), *The New Transatlantic Dialogue: Intergovernmental, Transgovernmental and Transnational Approaches*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001, pp. 3–44.
- POLLACK M. A. & SHAFFER G. C., 'Introduction: Transatlantic Governance in Historical and Theoretical Perspective', *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2010, pp. 10–25.
- POLLACK M. A. & SHAFFER G. C., *When Cooperation Fails: The International Law and Politics of Genetically Modified Foods*, Oxford University Press, 2009.
- POLLET M., 'Russia's War in Ukraine Dominates EU-US Trade and Tech Talks', *Euractiv*, 15 mai 2022, available at: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/russias-war-in-ukraine-dominates-eu-us-trade-and-tech-talks> (Accessed November 12, 2024).
- POULIOT V. & CORNUT J., 'Practice Theory and the Study of Diplomacy: A Research Agenda', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 2015, vol. 50, n° 3, pp. 297–315.
- PRASAD E. S., *The Dollar Trap: How the US Dollar Tightened Its Grip on Global Finance*, Princeton University Press, 2014.
- PROPP K., 'Negotiating with the European Union – A US Perspective', in FAHEY E. (EDS.), *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Relations*, 1re éd., Routledge, 2023, pp. 38–51.
- QUINNEY N., 'US Negotiating Behavior', *United States Institute for Peace*, 2002, vol. 94, pp. 1–12.
- RISSE T., 'Let's Argue!': Communicative Action in World Politics', *International Organization*, 2000, vol. 54, n° 1, pp. 1–39.
- ROGER C. & ROWAN S., 'The New Terrain of Global Governance: Mapping Membership in Informal International Organizations', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2023, vol. 67, n° 6, pp. 1248–1269.
- ROGER C. B., 'The Rise of Informal International Organizations', in FAHEY E. (EDS.), *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Relations*, 1re éd., Routledge, 2023, pp. 67–80.
- ROSENAU J. N., 'Governance in the Twenty-first Century', *Global Governance*, 1995, vol. 1, n° 1, pp. 13–43.
- RUGGIE J. G., 'Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution', *International Organization*, 1992, vol. 46, n° 3, pp. 561–598.
- SEAMAN J., 'China and the New Geopolitics of Technical Standardization', *Ifri*, 2020, pp. 1–31.
- SMITH M. & STEFFENSON R., 'The EU and the USA: Competitive Cooperation in a Turbulent World', in SMITH M. & STEFFENSON R. (EDS.), *International Relations and the European Union*, Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 372–399.
- STOKES B., & EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICES., *EU-US relations after the Inflation Reduction Act, and the challenges ahead*, Publications

- Office, European Parliament, 2024, available at: <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/385275> (Accessed October 17, 2024).
- STONE R. W., *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- STRANGE S., *States and Markets*, 2e éd., Pinter, 1994.
- THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA, 1995.
- THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP, 1998.
- TRANSATLANTIC DECLARATION ON EC-US RELATIONS, 1990.
- TRANSATLANTIC POLICY NETWORK (TPN), 'A Strategy to Strengthen Transatlantic Partnership', 2003, available at: <https://ap1.sib.uc.pt/bitstream/10316.2/114754/1/290-04.pdf> (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 'US-EU Joint Statement of the Trade and Technology Council', *US Department of Commerce*, 2022, available at: <https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2022/05/us-eu-joint-statement-trade-and-technology-council> (Accessed October 15, 2024).
- US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *Supplement to Treaties in Force 2020*, 2023, available at: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/TIF-Supplement-Report-2023.pdf> (Accessed October 21, 2024).
- US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2020*, 2020, available at: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/TIF-2020-Full-website-view.pdf> (Accessed October 21, 2024).
- US-EU MUTUAL RECOGNITION AGREEMENT, 1998.
- VABULAS F. & SNIDAL D., 'Organization Without Delegation: Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs) and the Spectrum of Intergovernmental Arrangements', *The Review of International Organizations*, 2013, vol. 8, n° 2, pp. 193–220.
- VAN ELSUWEGE P. & SZÉP V., 'The Revival of Transatlantic Partnership? EU-US Coordination in Sanctions Policy', in FAHEY E. (EDS.), *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Relations*, 1re éd., Routledge, 2023, pp. 81–95.
- WEISS T. G., & WILKINSON R., 'Rethinking Global Governance? Complexity, Authority, Power, Change', *International Studies Quarterly*, 2014, vol. 58, n° 1, pp. 207–215.
- WELFENS P. J. J. & HANRAHAN D., 'The EU-US Trade and Technology Council: Developments, Key Issues and Policy Options', *European Economy and International Economic Relations*, 2022, vol. 316, pp. 1–17.
- YOUNG A. R., 'The Transatlantic Regulatory Relationship: Limited Conflict, Less Competition and a New Approach to Cooperation', in FAHEY E. (EDS.), *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Relations*, 1re éd., Routledge, 2023, pp. 279–291.