https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597 fr https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=175 Port terminals which facilitate the import, export, and transshipment of seaborne cargo are predominantly operated by private firms. While private sector involvement in terminal operations has brought many advantages, their profit-oriented interest in deregulation and maximizing cargo throughput can put them at odds with port-level regulatory agencies. This is particularly the case with customs agencies, for which enforcement activities often require slow and intrusive scrutiny of cargo passing through port terminals. In this article, we argue that this tension may cause private terminal operators (PTOs) to obstruct customs enforcement. We identify six mechanisms through which PTOs can obstruct customs enforcement. And we argue the conditions under which PTOs are most likely to so obstruct customs enforcement through a case study of Chinese PTOs. On this basis, we present PTOs as an important stakeholder in efforts to ensure compliance with customs regimes and offer policy recommendations for improving PTO-customs relations in privately operated port terminals. Wed, 19 Mar 2025 00:00:00 +0100 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=175 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=148 This paper examines the underlying reasons why states have chosen to pursue a particular fissile material route in their nuclear weapons development. This analysis is conducted using case studies that describe historical developments and events, alongside an evaluation of their impact on the choice of fissile material route. Key areas of interest include the role of uranium resources, the visibility or covert nature of nuclear weapons activities, international relations, military delivery systems, and measures imposed by the export controls and nuclear safeguards regimes. The results of the work show that although uranium resources play a role, they impact the route in only one case. Insight into whether or not the nuclear weapon program is conducted openly or covertly does not seem to have impacted the selected fissile material route much, and the same can be said about the military delivery systems. In contrast, international relations, both in terms of government-to-government relations and proliferation networks, appear as far more important. The impact of export control and safeguards measures is shown to depend heavily on the context of international relations and the unique circumstances of each case. Sun, 09 Feb 2025 00:00:00 +0100 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=148 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=144 Since the AUKUS Agreement was signed in 2021, there has been an ambitious reform agenda intended to align Australian export control laws with those of the US to ensure license-free exports of military and dual-use technologies upon which both Pillars of the AUKUS Agreement could be reliant. However, the Commonwealth government has missed a golden opportunity, by failing to contemplate how those export control reforms could be used to truly provide for safe and secure conduct of cutting-edge research in higher education institutions. The notion of “research security”—that is, “safeguarding the research enterprise against the misappropriation of research and development to the detriment of national or economic security, related violations of research integrity, and foreign government interference”—appears to have been far from the minds of Parliament. This paper engages in a criticism of Australian export controls from the perspective of research security, highlighting aspects of the framework which fall short of protecting our institutions from malign foreign actors. Several recommendations are also made about potential opportunities for future reform that have broader application than just the Australian context and could be adopted by other jurisdictions looking to tighten their own research security frameworks. Tue, 03 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=144 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=142 The sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation following its further invasion of Ukraine in 2022 include measures such as the seizing of goods and freezing of assets. As the war between Russia and Ukraine grinds on, the call to confiscate these goods and assets, and use the proceeds for the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine, are growing stronger. However, this endeavor is not without legal challenges, particularly concerning the repurposing of frozen Russian sovereign assets, such as the exchange reserves of the Central Bank of Russia, for which there is no clear basis under international law. Based on a legal assessment, the author argues that repurposing these assets, even if such an action does not fully meet the criteria to be classified as a third-party countermeasure, can still be justified as an in extremis measure given the exceptional circumstances of the current situation, provided certain conditions are satisfied. Such an in extremis measure cannot be considered a rule of customary international law as state practice is not sufficiently widespread, representative, and consistent and opinio juris is still lacking. Wed, 23 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0200 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=142 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=133 Since the announcement of the AUKUS trilateral security partnership in September 2021, critics have attacked the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) as a key obstacle to its success. Echoing long-standing frustrations over the regulatory burden of the ITAR, these critics manufactured an “AUKUS-ITAR dilemma” which seemed to require a general ITAR exemption for military trade between the three partner countries. This dilemma minimized critical disparities between the Australian, U.K., and U.S. military export control regimes and exaggerated the impact of ITAR reform on the success of AUKUS, especially on the emerging technology collaboration envisioned in the second pillar of the partnership. Yet recent U.S. legislation and regulatory reform indicate that rather than eliminating U.S. military export controls, the AUKUS-ITAR dilemma has resulted in a more robust, ITAR-based plurilateral export control regime dominated by U.S. interests and primed for further expansion. Tue, 08 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0200 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=133 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=112 Chemical and biological security International law prohibits chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery establishing a framework of norms, standards, and rules to guarantee that under no circumstances these weapons are developed, produced, acquired, or used. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are important elements of this framework and share a common goal to counter the misuse of advances in life sciences, chemistry, and related fields. Both conventions rely on the general purpose criterion to ensure that biological agents, toxins, and chemicals are utilized solely for peaceful ends that benefit human, animal, and plant health, and the environment. The full and effective implementation of these conventions continues to face challenges. The re-emergence of chemical warfare tactics during armed conflict, as evidenced by the civil war in Syria and the ongoing war of Russia against Ukraine where the Russian armed forces have used riot control agents in violation of the CWC is an acute reminder that the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture requires constant tending.1 The deployment of chemical warfare agents as weapons for state-sponsored targeted assassinations tests the limits of the chemical prohibition regime and broadens the range of preconditions that need to be in place to ensure effective counter and defense against such threats. Recent attacks including the targeting of Sergei Skripal and Mon, 02 Sep 2024 00:00:00 +0200 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=112 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=128 Addressing the gap in dual-use research within the framework of responsible research under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) presents a significant challenge for all stakeholders, particularly within life science communities. While biosecurity education has long been recognized as a key strategy to address this issue, its effective implementation remains crucial. In this contribution, the authors provide an overview of the recently edited volume Essentials of Biological Security: A Global Perspective, describing its potential as a pivotal tool in addressing this gap. The book begins by underscoring the importance of enhancing biological security, particularly in the post-pandemic era, and defines biological security as the prevention of natural, accidental, and deliberate disease in humans, animals, and plants. While stressing the interrelated and critical nature of these aspects, the book primarily focus on the prevention of deliberate disease within the life sciences. In this context, the authors underscore and address the crucial role of scientists and their institutions, as highlighted by the World Health Organisation (WHO)’s Global Guidance Framework for the Responsible Use of the Life Sciences. In addition to delineating the structure and content of the book, its timeliness, significance, overarching objectives, and scope, this commentary proposes that, in the longer term, an International Biological Security Education Network (IBSEN), akin to the successful model of the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) managed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), would be essential in effectively improving biosecurity. Mon, 02 Sep 2024 00:00:00 +0200 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=128 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=122 Controlling the development, utilization, or transfer of dual-use technologies underlying non-conventional weaponry has become a significant issue from a disarmament and non-proliferation perspective. However, evidence suggests that stakeholder communities often lack awareness of technology transfer risks and their responsibilities in preventing or mitigating their consequences. This article examines the case of the master’s course on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)-relevant dual-use technology transfer controls developed within the framework of the European Union-funded Targeted Initiatives on “Export Controls of Dual-Use Materials and Technologies” as part of efforts to address these challenges. The paper outlines the process of developing and implementing this modular course, successfully implemented in several former Soviet republics in Central Asia and Southeast Europe. Emphasizing the preference for education over more traditional training approaches, the article discusses how the course aims to enhance awareness and foster responsible behavior among stakeholders. In addition to assisting academic institutions in setting up the courses and advancing knowledge among professors, significant effort was invested in engaging decision-makers and various stakeholder communities to broaden the educational initiative’s foundations. Under the organizing theme of building a culture of responsibility, these interactions proved to have significant educational value and contributed to the core ambitions of local ownership and sustainability. In conclusion, the article argues that sustained educational efforts and collaborative initiatives are essential for addressing challenges posed by dual-use technology transfers and contributing to global security and non-proliferation efforts. Wed, 28 Aug 2024 00:00:00 +0200 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=122 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=113 The article examines the use of case studies to support training programs focused on the nonproliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials and equipment. It argues that educational methods that induce ‘deep learning’ help to impart a more comprehensive and meaningful understanding of the subject matter. CBRN-focused training and development courses have seen substantial growth in recent years, reflecting an increasing recognition of the major risks posed by CBRN proliferation. However, there remain obstacles to implementing such programs, both due to the limited resources available and the need to educate a diverse and global-dispersed community of practitioners. Pedagogical methods that place the trainee at the center of the teaching process are known to induce a deeper understanding and develop critical thinking skills. Case studies are particularly effective in this endeavor as they offer a dynamic means of grounding complex or intangible concepts into relatable, realistic situations. Case studies also induce a storytelling quality, a mnemonic device that helps learners recall large amounts of information and for long durations. The article argues however that the selection of case studies requires improvement to reduce bias. There is current lack of diversity in available case studies, and for too long, case studies have tended to reflect Western priorities and may not be easily relatable to non-Western audiences. Lastly, the article emphasizes that the utility of the case study approach comes down to how effectively they are curated within a broader curriculum as well as how well they are taught, which requires skillful facilitators who can cultivate a dynamic and engaging discussion. Tue, 27 Aug 2024 00:00:00 +0200 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=113 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=116 This paper aims to evaluate the ‘Pathway Evolution Process’ (PEP) serious game method, developed by nuclear regulators and their technical support at the European level (SITEX network). This method aims to organize the exchange of experience and (non-)knowledge between nuclear waste experts, stakeholders, and the public on the safety and management of the long-term radioactive waste program, by placing uncertainty at the center of the evaluation process. Such interdisciplinary dialogue also promotes learning for both players and experts. This paper draws on feedback from its implementation in Belgium in 2021 with engineering and policy researchers, students, and representatives of Belgian Nuclear Regulatory Bodies. Considering this method as a hybrid forum, the paper highlights how the ‘game’ side allows participants to systematically evaluate and question all the ethical and socio-technical aspects of the program while leaving space for contrasting positions to emerge. It also emphasizes that experts can play different roles when interacting with different audiences. More generally, this article questions the value and limits of serious games for knowledge production on sensitive and complex policies. Mon, 26 Aug 2024 00:00:00 +0200 https://popups.uliege.be/2952-7597/index.php?id=116