Identity, Opposition and Limitation as the Three Necessary a Priori Conditions for Anticipation

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Abstract

In this paper we investigate in which way the transcendental proof for the antinomy of pure reason, as presented by Kant and Fichte, can clarify something concerning anticipation. Kant, and especially Fichte, derive from this proof (by way of a reduction ad absurdum) that all forms of thinking presuppose the principle of idenity, opposition and limitation. As a consequence, this means that anticipation, as a form of thinking, must presuppose all three principles. How do these three principles, concerning anticipation, function?

Keywords: identity, opposition, difference, limitation, necessary condition

1 Transcendental philosophy

How can transcendental philosophy be relevant for the question concerning anticipation? In general, transcendental philosophy wants to produce an insight in the a priori concepts (or necessary conditions) of thinking. The main transcendental question is: how, or under which conditions, is thinking possible? We can reformulate this question: how, or under which conditions is anticipation possible?

Kant, but in a more direct way Fichte, showed us those necessary conditions, which are the metaphysical principles of *identity*, *opposition* and *limitation*.[1] These principles are fundamental if we want to think about the world at all. When we reformulate those metaphysical principles[2] (as Fichte did) as logical principles[3] we get:

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[1] Fichte J., *Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. I/2, p. 255 – 282. (further abbreviation: GAI/2)

[2] It's important to mention that Fichte posits these three metaphysical principles as a hypothesis. The proof for there validity has to be delivered by the way they make thinking and being possible. In this way, there is no absolute proof for their validity. Fichte argues that his metaphysical system can only be proofed by two relative proofs. The first is a theoretical proof which will be an apagogic proof. The second proof is a practical or a historical proof, which means that only life as such can show the validity of his hypothetical metaphysical principles.

[3] These three metaphysical principles have a content and a form. In a superficial way these three principles are standing for the connection between being (as content) and thinking (as form). That's exactly why they are called 'metaphysical'. In abstracting the content of these three metaphysical principles we can deduce three logical principles which concern thinking as such.

1. the logical principle of identity : 'A = A'
2. the logical principle of opposition: 'A ≠ -A'
3. the logical principle of limitation (or grounding): A is partially = A and partially = -A.

When these three principles are the a priori necessary conditions for every form of thinking as such, then they must be relevant for every form of anticipation as well. This is however, not obviously so, and at least the principle of limitation stands in need of further argumentation.

In this article we want to reassert the transcendental claim for the three a priori principles as necessary conditions by showing how they are relevant for the concept of anticipation. By means of a proof as a reductio ad absurdum we want to demonstrate how anticipation presupposes the principe of identity, opposition and limitation.

2 A reductio ad absurdum

Let us suppose that every form of thinking only needs the principle of identity and opposition. Let us give the sceptic concerning the transcendental statement of the three principles the benefit of the doubt and suppose that anticipation is only based on the principle of identity 'A = A' and the principle of opposition 'A ≠ -A'.

Anticipation presupposes time. After all, you want to anticipate something which is not yet, something which will occur in the future. At the very least, this means that you expect that something *different*, something *changed*, something *new* can happen. If, in general, something new was impossible, if in such a way everything would stay the same, which means that only the principle of identity would apply (A = A = A = A etc.), then in general nothing would have to be anticipated. So, anticipation presupposes the possibility of a modification, or time against which we can place the change.[4] To be able to anticipate, at minimum, we must have in opposition of situation S in time t, a future situation S' in time t'. Technically spoken: when S and S' oppose each other, then they must be different in at least

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[4] The superficial objection can be made here that the possibility of modification is no necessary condition for anticipation. One can state that people anticipate that the sun will rise tomorrow and this is certainly not a change. We doubt. If people anticipate the rising of the sun, the question is what exactly they anticipate. The more they make abstraction of the concrete circumstances in which the sun will rise (the colour of the sun, the weatherconditions et cetera) the higher the probability of their anticipation will be, but the less interesting this anticipation is. There's nothing exciting in anticipating a natural law. The probability of the rising of the sun as such is high, but nevertheless in the history of the world, it already happened several times that she rose in a very unexpected form. Let's really suppose that every thing stays the same, that nothing changes! Anticipation would be totally meaningless. For instance, it's very interesting to anticipate in which form a certain virus will spread out over the world, because a virus changes all the time.

one feature. Two different (or opposing) situations should differ in at least one feature.[5] In other words: between S and S' there must be a border, a limit, a difference; or anticipating means you can only anticipate something which is probable. With this, the question concerning anticipation can be reformulated. If S and S' differ in at least one feature, then the question is: can this difference be anticipated by the sole means of identity and opposition?

Our main question is: can we, from the principles $A = A$ and $A \neq -A$ anticipate the difference between S and S'? If only the principles identity and opposition are avaliable, then we must at least comprehend the difference between S and S' as a difference between A and -A. In other words, if there is time and difference, then the conclusion drawn from our two principles has to be that the difference between S and S' is only possible to the extent to which those two principles are making the difference possible, and this can be no more than the difference between A and -A. No different form of distinction I conceivable here. Following from both of these logical principles, each difference is only comprehensible as a difference between A and -A. Concerning this conclusion, we can draw attention to four things.

First, suppose that one states that by means of those two principles we are able to anticipate. Whenever there is change, one knows for certain that from A there must necessarily follow -A. In that way, this anticipation is logical and absolutely correct. But, we are forced to conclude that this form of anticipation is not relevant, and therefore nonsense. As when time keeps on running and there appears another change, then, after the anticipated -A at time t', there must occur A at time t'', and there again -A at time t''', etc.; consequently we obtain the sequence: (t A $\rightarrow$ t' -A $\rightarrow$ t'' A $\rightarrow$ t''' -A $\rightarrow$ etc.). But, what can be concluded? In general, it seems that nothing new occurs in this succession of A and -A; as a consequence, in the sequence of A and -A there is no change (nothing new occurs), by which the concepts of time, difference and border in the sequence of A and -A are eliminated. The first anticipated difference t' -A is, in general, no change, thus the concept of anticipation is done away with as well.

Secondly, because time t is absent in the sequence of A and -A, we can translate our sequence as: (A $\rightarrow$ -A $\rightarrow$ A $\rightarrow$ -A $\rightarrow$ etc.). What does this sequence mean? To clarify, we must introduce the transcendental concept of *sufficient reason*. We define a sufficient reason as follows: when S is sufficient reason for S', then S' must necessary be if S is, because S is a *sufficient* reason for S' (nothing more than S is needed to have S'). So, when S is, then S' is as well. Important to note is that time is absent in this concept of sufficient reason. (There's no tension, friction or difference between the being of S and S'.) We can formalise this as S $\rightarrow$ S'. When in the sequence (A $\rightarrow$ -A $\rightarrow$ A $\rightarrow$ -A $\rightarrow$ etc.) time is not conceivable, then this means that A is a sufficient reason for -A. But, because time is absent, the same reasoning counts in the opposite direction. In other words A $\rightarrow$ -A, and -A $\rightarrow$ A, or:

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[5] Fichte J., GAI/2, p. 272.

A ↔ -A. *Or, in general: A = -A, which is of course totally absurd.*[6] The consequence of this reasoning which leads to absurdity, is devastating. It means that both the principle of identity and the principle of opposition break down. On the one hand A = A, and on the other hand A ≠ -A is no longer conceivable. If our two principles break down, is there something left to think about?

Thirdly, one could say that both concepts A and -A and both principles can be salvaged. One could say that our two principles make more forms of difference possible than just the one between A and -A; as such, the irrelevant sequence of A and -A can be avoided. What if we state a more complex difference then the difference between A and -A? Let's give it a try. Due to the fact that only A and -A are available, the only way to make the difference between A and -A more complex is by cumulating A or -A. So, let's state that S is equal to AA and S' to A-A, so that another more complex difference becomes noticeable here. We disagree. When we consider the prefix A in AA and A-A, then both are the same: AX = AX; and considering the suffix both are unequal and opposite: XA ≠ X-A. Does this means that there exists another form of difference than seen in the case of A ≠ -A? No! Because the prefix in S and S' is the same, the prefix is not different pertaining to the difference between A and -A. In other words, the prefix is, in reference to the difference between A and -A irrelevant. Consequently, the difference between A ≠ -A and XA ≠ X-A is the same. Conclusion: the difference between S and S', comprehended as a more complex difference doesn't bring us any further. In general, we keep on getting stuck at the absurd and all devastating sequence of (A = -A = A = etc.).

Fourthly, does the difference between A and -A explain anything at all? Being that the difference between A and -A only makes possible the ever recurring, and so never ending, sequence of A and -A, we may ask the question of whether the principles of identity and opposition can elucidate change after all and thereby allow anticipation. As mentioned above, we disagree.

3 The transcendental proof reductio ad absurdum (or the antinomy of pure reason)

A similar conclusion, the fundamental impossibility to anticipate on the basis of the two logical principles was already delivered by transcendental philosophy. This proof is the well-known antinomy of pure reason.[7] Again, let's suppose we only have the concepts of A and -A and the principles of identity and opposition. When we apply both concepts and logical principles, what do we achieve? What we have demonstrated above, can be demonstrated in a more abstract and general way. This

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[6] Here we get a first indication that the presupposition that thinking only presupposes the principe of identity and opposition, leads to an absurdity.

[7] Kant I., *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 432 – B 595. (further abbreviation: KrV) Fichte J., GAI/2, p. 268 – 273.

demonstration is the transcendental proof reductio ad absurdum,[8] or the antinomy of pure[9] reason. It has been presented by Fichte, on which we inspire ourselves.

Premisse 1:
Suppose there is A. Due to the fact we made abstraction of the concept of limitation, A is absolutely identical with itself (the principle of identity) and on the basis of the principle of opposition it denies -A in an absolute way. As a consequence -A is not.[10] Thus, everything that is, is = A. The absolute coincides with A.[11]

Premisse 2:
However, A can only be, if -A is. A only has meaning as A in contrast (limitation) with -A.

Conclusion 1:
Premisse 1 and 2 contradict each other. If A is absolute, then A eliminates itself, because it eliminates its necessary presupposition, which is -A.

Premisse 3:
Suppose there is -A. Due to the fact we made abstraction of the concept of limitation, -A is absolutely identical with itself (the principle of identity) and on the basis of the principle of opposition it denies A in an absolute way. As a consequence A is not.[12] Thus, everything that is, is = -A. The absolute coincides with -A.[13]

Premisse 4:
However, -A can only be, if A is. -A only has meaning as -A in contrast (limitation) with A.

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[8] Fichte, FWI, pag. p. 105 – 107. What we bring here is the reasoning which Fichte presented as a proof reductio ad absurdum for any form of thinking who wants to ignore the principle of limitation.

[9] Pure means here formally, which can be understood as a purely formal reasoning, a reasoning without any content concerning the world. (Or, in other words, a reasoning with an abstraction of the principle of limitation.)

[10] One has to understand that here, in this argument, -A is absolutely nothing, by which there is absolutely no ontological and epistemological (or in general: metaphysical) reference between A and -A.

[11] Note: since we do not have the concept of limitation, it's obvious that A is absolute. Nevertheless, if there would have to be a -A, then it can only be in an absolutely different metaphysical space, which means that there would be two universes, which is of course absurd.

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[13] Note: since we do not have the concept of limitation, it's obvious that -A is absolute. Nevertheless, if there would have to be a A, then it can only be in an absolutely different metaphysical space, which means that there would be two universes, which is of course absurd.

Conclusion 2:
Premisse 3 and 4 contradict each other. If -A is absolute, then -A eliminates itself, because it eliminates its necessary presupposition, which is A.

Conclusion 3:
From conclusion 1 and 2, there follows that both concepts and both principles eliminate themselves, by which our supposition to drop the principle of limitation as defined above collapses. As a consequence, we lose every basis to gain knowledge, by which A equals -A and -A equals A, or (A = -A = A = -A etc.). The conclusion is that the difference between A and -A, on the basis of the principles of identity and opposition, is no longer conceivable. Everything seems to point towards the same empty and all devastating sequence from above. Or, the conclusion is that A = -A.

However, we can imagine that not everyone is persuaded by the transcendental antinomy of pure reason. One can claim that we are not loyal to our supposition. For instance premisse 2 and 4 presuppose limitation. We have to admit. But this is exactly the whole idea. If we do not presuppose limitation, the only thing we can do is identify and oppose the absolute with itself, which means that the absolute A and the absolute -A are one and the same, which is of course without any meaning. In this case, only premisse 1 and 3 are valid, which means that A and -A are absolute, by which A = -A.

We add an argument of authority and an extension. Kant (and his successor Fichte) pointed out nothing else.[14] So Kant indicated that out of a pure and therefore unlimited thinking we can derive a proof for the existence, as well the non-existence, of God[15]; which we formally can understand as a proof for an absolute A and an absolute -A. But, precisely the absolute character of both is a fundamental contradiction, by which both proofs become absurd.[16] Out of this reasoning Kant derived the conclusion that all reasoning, without the concept of limitation, is absurd. The ultimate consequence is that A = -A, which is of course absurd. As a matter fact, Kants shows us that every thinking without limitation is a pure castle in the air.

Most probably, for the one that is transcendentally unskilled, it is comprehensible that the principle of opposition presupposses the principle of identity. The sign '/' only has meaning in contrast with the sign '='; '≠' means not equal. To be able to know what differs, it is necessary to know what's the same. That is, what's not equal becomes clear in contrast with what's equal. As a consequence we can make the following proposition: two different things must be equal in at least one feature. Two things that differ, must have a moment of synthesis.[17]

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[14] Fichte J. GAI/3, p. 91 – 123. Kant I., KrV B 349 – 732 (It concerns here the whole second part of Kants book, namely: *Die transzendentale Dialektik*.)

[15] Kant I., KrV B 595 – 670.

[16] As mentioned above, there can only one metaphysical sphere.

[17] Fichte J., GAI/3 p. 272.

Nevertheless, it can be more difficult to comprehend that '=' is only understandable in contrast with '/'. Namely, what's equal is only clear in contrast with what's not equal. Probably, one has more difficulty with this last proposition. But the fundamental question is: on which basis does one mean that identity, as such, can be understood without any presupposition! Above, we demonstrated that two different things must be equal in at least one feature. But vice versa, the proposition holds that two equal things must differ in at least one feature. Two identical things, must have a moment of analysis.[18]

4 The principle of limitation (or the principle of grounding)

What can we conclude out of this aporia? Our reasoning, by which we started from the sole principles of identity and opposition, points out the necessity of a third principle to make anticipation, or the understanding of difference and identity (or thinking as such) possible. What can this be? We have just posited two statements:

(1) two different situations must be equal in at least one feature
(2) two equal situations must differ in at least one feature

Integrating both statements, we can formulate the next: two situations must be equal in at least one feature and different in at least one feature. Consequently: in general, when we have only two situations, let's say A and -A, and both differ, then -A has to be partially A and partially -A, and then A has to be partially A and partially -A. In its highest abstraction this means that every X is partially X and partially -X. [19] With this we have derived an important principle of the transcendental philosophy, namely the *principle of limitation* (or grounding).[20]
We are aware that such a principle will drive some philosophers mad. Nevertheless, one can refute the principle of limitation. But in so doing, one must demonstrate how one can derive something merely out of the principles of identity and opposition. Positing the principle of limitation, in general it only means that something (a concept, a situation or a being, or we can say life after all) can only be under the condition that it is finite, or limited. This explains the name of this principle: this principle describes the necessary condition (the ground) on which something can be, and this is limitation.[21]
We have to admit that we can't provide an absolute proof for this principle. The only proof we provided, was a reductio ad absurdum. But, let's make a second

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[18] Ibid.

[19] X has to be comprehended as this presupposition, that states that synthesis and analysis, can only be, when they in one moment go together. We will demonstrate that this going together mean that they are each others necessary condition.

[20] Fichte J., GAI/3, p. 272.

[21] By which we have also given the principle for each form of complexity as well.

exercise and suppose that the principle of limitation is valid. Which logical material is available now? At this moment we possess the principles of identity, opposition and limitation, and we have the concepts A and -A, and we have the concept of limitation by which X is for a part X and for a part -X. Concerning the question of anticipation, does this bring us any further? Out of those three principles (identity, opposition, limitation) and three concept (A, -A and X) we can provide two reasonings.

Reasoning 1: In which way is the difference (analysis) between A and -A comprehensible? According to the principle of limitation this is possible, if and only if we can indicate the identity of A and -A. As a consequence, the difference between A and -A is only possible and comprehensible if A and -A have, through their difference, something in common (synthesis). As for the principle of limitation, X being partially X and partially -X, means that X is in this case partially A and partially -A, by which the similarity between A and -A is nothing else than X.

Mind you: what X exactly is, is not clear, that's exactly why we call it X. But the apagogic proof points out we have to presuppose X as being partially A and partially -A. If we refuse to presuppose X, then because of the lack of a conjunction between A and -A, both fall apart in two different metaphysical spheres, by which it comes senseless to speak of a difference between A and -A. The reductio ad absurdum demonstrated how in this case A equals -A in a total or absolute way (A = -A).

Herewith, we bump upon a second fundamental concept of transcendental philosophy: the concept of necessary condition. In general we comprehend a necessary condition, as this condition X, without which a Y cannot be. X is a necessary condition for Y, which means that if Y is, X as well must be; but the being of X does not necessarily mean that Y is. After all X is only a *necessary* condition and not a sufficient reason. As a consequence, this means that there is between X and Y, friction, time or limitation.

Concerning our question for the difference between A and -A, this means that Y comprehended as the difference between A and -A can't be without X. Identity is a necessary condition to comprehend opposition, but of course identity does not explain opposition. Identity is no sufficient reason for opposition. So, without X there is no Y, or no difference between A and -A, and in this case there can be no A and -A as well.

Reasoning 2: Because of X, being the conjunction of A and -A, we can derive the proposition that both are in a certain way (or partially) equal. Both are in X partially identical. Is this identity (synthesis) comprehensible? According to the principle of grounding, this is only possible if we can indicate the difference (analysis) between A and -A. The identity between A and -A is only possible if they are, through what they have in common, different in at least one feature. If they do not differ at all, then in accordance with the antinomy of the pure reason,

they coincide absolutely, by which the concepts A, -A and identity lose all meaning. In other words, difference is a necessary condition for the identity between A and -A.

From reasonings 1 and 2 we can formulate our central conclusion. Both reasonings show that identity is a necessary condition for difference and difference is a necessary condition for identity. Both are necessary conditions for each other. But, does this mean that identity and difference are one and the same, that they are for each other a sufficient reason? No! Precisely because of the concept of limitation, it is not possible for them to be each other's sufficient condition. The concept of limitation means that there is an irreducible and non-anticipatible distinction between identity and difference. Appleid to time this means things can only happen if they are for a part new. That what happens is for a part new because what happens doesn't come out of the blue (there is no creatio ex nihilo). What happens, happens on the basis of some necessary conditions. In a certain way that what happens is for a part conditioned, and in a certain way it's for a part unconditioned, which means that in that what happens, something non-anticipatable, something new emerges.

This non-anticipatible distinction explains why we can't provide an absolute proof for the principle of limitation. Should there be an absolute proof for the principle of limitation, then there must be a sufficient reason for it. But precisely this is impossible. Our reasoning pointed out that from the concept of sufficient reason, the concept of difference is absolutely incomprehensible. If the new that occurs would have a sufficient reason, it cannot possibly be something new.

Nevertheless, we are not without means to anticipate. When we concretise this reasoning, then this means that out of the concept of identity, it is clear *that* a difference must occur, but *what* this difference finally will be, is not derivable from the concept of identity. Inverse counts the same. Because difference is only a necessary condition for identity, that which is identical is, out of the concept of difference, not derivable. As a consequence, *what* finally will be is not determinable and therefore non-anticipatible. But it is clear and necessary *that* something will be.

5 Anticipating what happens

Suppose there is a situation A. What do we know? What can we anticipate? We know that something will become, but what will become is unclear. Therefore, what we know is: A → B. But what can B be?

(I)   Because A has to change, we know that B can never be equal to A

(II)   Because A is a necessary condition for B, B cannot be without A, or A must be in B

(III)   Because of (I) and (II), B is more than A, so B must be = AX

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(IV)   Because A is only a necessary condition, we know *that* B (as = AX) must be, but we do not know *what* X can be. (Cave: B(or X) is not determined, but because A is B's necessary condition, B is not absolutely undetermined.)

Therefore B must = AX. (A as a necessary condition for B and X for the new in B.) So, because of the principle of limitation B is partially (as A) determined and partially (as X) undetermined. So, what B can be is AA, AB, AC, AD, AE or A∞. B can be everything, but this *everything* is not absolutely coincidental or determined. It's only determined by its necessary condition, namely A. Thus, if we have A, then B can be AA, AB, AC, AD, A∞, et cetera.

A second step: suppose B occurred as a AF (which means: X pointed out to be = F). So A → B, or, we now know: A → AF. When AF has occurred, what can be next? What we now know is AF, and when time keeps running, after AF something new has to occur. So, what we know is AF → C. What can C be?

(I)   Because AF has to change, we know that C can never be equal to AF
(II)   Because AF is a necessary condition for C, C cannot be without AF, or AF has to be in C
(III)   Because of (I) and (II), C is more than AF, so C must be = AFX
(IV)   Because AF is only a necessary condition, we know that C (as = AFX) must be, but we do not know what X can be, which means that, by the exception that it cannot be AF, X is not determined.

Therefore, C must be = AFX. (AF as a necessary condition for C and X for the undetermined new in C.) So, what C can be is AFA, or AFB, or AFC, or AFD, or AF∞. Thus, what C can be is everything, but this everything is not absolute coincidental or determined. It is partially determined by its necessary condition, namely AF. If we have AF, then C can be AFA, AFB, AFC, AFD, AF∞, etc.

Historically spoken:
A means: Caesar marches up to the Rubicon.
B or AF means: Caesar crosses the Rubicon (alea iacta est).
What will AFX be or mean?
AFA can mean: Caesar got a cold by crossing the Rubicon and dies. (by crossing the river, Caesar made by accident his feet wet)
AFB can mean: Caesar marches up to Pompeius' legion and wins (veni vidi vici).
AFC can mean: Ceaser marches up to Pompeius' legion and is defeated (vae victus).

What did happen? AFB did happen. But AFB could only happen because of A and AF, because they are the necessary condition (and not the sufficient condition) for AFB.[22] [23]

6 Anticipating the necessary condition

Concerning the possibility to anticipate, what does our reasoning mean? Does it mean the impossibility for anticipation? We want to invert the whole case. In a superficial way, one can state that it is the principle of limitation which makes anticipation impossible, and therefore the rumour is spread that this principle is irrational and annoying. Our issue is, it is precisely the principle of limitation which makes anticipation to a certain level possible. We have the opportunity to determine what the necessary condition of X is. Which means that we can anticipate relativily, not absolutely.

Suppose we want to anticipate DX for which D is the necessary condition. If we should know what D is, then in reference with DX we can already anticipate something. Suppose we know that D exists out of [ABF?KJ?A] by which every symbol represents a specific necessary condition. In this case, some necessary conditions in reference to X are determined and are already known, and some are still mysterious and are subject to scientific investigation. To determine these unknown necessary conditions, in other words, to determine their *identity*, we have to compare *different* situations on their *identity* and we have to compare *identical* situations on their *difference*. When our investigation points out that [ABF?KJ?A] = [ABF*C*KJ?A], by which we have determined a specific necessary condition as *C*, then we can anticipate that DX in each case is = [ABF*C*KJ?A]X. On the other hand, in case we discovered that [ABF?KJ?A] ≠ [ABF*D*KJ?A] and [ABF*E*KJ?A], by which we have determined that a certain specific necessary condition can never

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[22] One can make the objection that besides, the assertion that A and AF are necessary conditions but not sufficient seems to be the highlight of my paper. One can state that my thesis is build upon the simple meaning that there are only some missing premises, and that missing premises are nothing new! I want to make my point again. The whole problem I want to point at is not a lack of premises. This is really too easy. The point is that what will come, namely AFX that X is absolutely unpremisable! There is nothing that can help you to anticipate what X in AFX will be. The only thing you will be able to anticipate is AF. And that's already something.

[23] One can make the objection I am making an attempt to do reasoning in propisitional logic without having the simplest knowledge about that logic. For example, one can state that AFB stands not only for a proposition, but for a conjunction of propositions, by which I am confusing logic with reality. I want to make clear that I am not confusing logic with reality. My point is in which way logic or thinking can be relevant for reality. So, I want to mix them up deliberatry. What can anticipation be about, if we may only anticipate what can not be! This is what transcendental philosophy is about, how can thinking be relevant for being! To make clear, I have nothing against logic. But the analytical philosopher has to know, that on the moment he wants to anticipate or say something about the world, he is leaving the pure logical territory and enters the territory of reality; and reality is only thinkable under the condition of identity, opposition and *limitation*.

be **D** and **E**, then we have anticipated that DX can necessarily not be [ABF*(-D, -E)*KJ?A]Y. What can we conclude? We are able to anticipate D, but we will never be able to anticipate X. Nevertheless, in knowing what D is, science has achieved progress.

As a consequence, this is our main conclusion: we can not anticipate absolutely what can be (= DX), but we can anticipate in a relative way what the necessary condition for DX is, namely D.

7 The logical mistake we make in ignoring the principle of limitation

Ignoring the principle of limitation, and restricting oneself to the principles of identity and opposition, leads us into a logical mistake. Out of this ignorance and restriction, we ignore X, and as a consequence we lose all perspective on what reality in fact is. Therefore [ABF?KJ?A]X becomes equal to [ABF?KJ?A]; or [ABF?KJ?A]X = [ABF?KJ?A]. In its highest abstraction this means that A = -A, which is in contradiction with the principles of identity and non-contradiction, which is of course absurd.

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