

The Importance of Anticipation in Kant's Philosophy

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Abstract:

This paper attempts to follow the thread formed by anticipation in Kant's general philosophy, and in particular in his theoretical philosophy, in order to tease out the precise meaning of the notion. Particular attention is given to the finiteness of the subject, the notion of teleology, Kant's peculiar account of pure interest and the way in which these notions are interwoven. This serves to clarify the peculiar status of anticipation as a primarily subjective activity, based on finiteness and subjective engagement. Furthermore, an attempt is made to gain insight in the way a subject capable of anticipation is structured and the way it is related to its own structure.

Keywords: Kant, epistemology, system, teleology, anticipation.

1 Introduction

The notion of anticipation takes a central place in Kant's general philosophy, and in particular in his epistemology. It is therefore peculiar that he rarely uses the term itself. In its technical, architectonic meaning, it only occurs as a principle of pure Understanding, which is a schematized category. What I wish to argue in this paper is that the notion's importance for our Understanding of Kant's philosophical strategy reaches far beyond this brief discussion, and is central to several of its main themes, such as his account of transcendental idealism and the theory of the faculties. In result, the paper will sketch a number of guiding threads for a novel reading of the many specific arguments in Kant's philosophy. This means, however, that I will not be able to go into the particulars of many of these arguments and theses.

Before taking off for this bird's-eye view of Kant's theory, a preliminary discussion of the nature of anticipation may be in place. Even though the conception that is expounded here can only come to full clarity and maturity when its precise role in the Kantian account of transcendental philosophy is shown, it can be useful to indicate some of the major characteristics of anticipation as it appears in the Critiques, especially those that serve as distinguishing marks. Anticipation is, after all, not a very obvious notion in epistemology. It can even make us somewhat uncomfortable, for it indicates a kind of inadequacy, of fallibility, of incompleteness. This casts doubt upon its epistemological worth. It is clear that a theory which works with anticipation already stresses the finitude of knowledge or the faculties which serve to acquire knowledge.

Anticipation is to be distinguished clearly from more epistemologically optimistic accounts of dealing with the future, with the ineluctable and ever-present not-yet. The

distinctive mark of anticipation is its subjective nature, which becomes apparent in two interrelated characteristics.

First of all, the belief in the occurrence of a future event is not epistemically justified. By this I mean that it is not justified by –or merely by– a prediction on the basis of past occurrences. There is no calculus which gives a deterministic or probabilistic result to the question of what is to come. This does not preclude a certain kind of justification for it, but merely excludes an epistemic, knowledge-based justification. It can be justified in those areas where knowledge of previous events, i.e. empirical knowledge or information, is of no avail. This first mark thus suggests that an anticipatory system cannot be identified naively with a system acting on the basis of a predictive model.

Secondly, it is interest-related. Objective reasoning allows –or should allow– one to make a value and interest-free judgment about a future state or event. Because of this impersonality, it is dissociated from the eventual outcome, and is a stand-alone state of knowledge about a fact. Nothing is really jeopardized by a negative outcome, because this simply indicates a statistical anomaly or a mistake in the reasoning. Anticipation, in contrast, can give no objective justification, and is therefore based on a subjective one. This makes the desirability of the outcome the only important criterion. Dissociation is rendered impossible for precisely this reason, which results in a kind of anxious expectancy. This means that anticipation rather than prediction is the notion we should use to grasp living systems, whose behavior is fundamentally interest-driven.

This account of subjectivity is precisely the one given by Kant in the *Dialectic of pure Reason* and in the third Critique. I will return to these elements in due time, but wish to start off with an exposition of the precise place where anticipation enters the scene in the Kantian system, which is, perhaps not surprisingly, the very first page of the *Transcendental Aesthetics*.

2 The Problem of Affection

In the *Transcendental Aesthetics*, Kant attempts to expound the nature of (human) sensibility. This discussion has had a profound influence on philosophy and science, but is rarely endorsed nowadays, because of a number of large difficulties. In this section, I wish to discuss the first of these, whereas the next section will deal with the second. The third, the problematic endorsement of Euclidean geometry as the only possible geometry, is not essential to the topic of this paper and will not be discussed, interesting as it may be.

The first problem with the *Transcendental Aesthetics* is a profound one, and touches upon the whole of Kant's project. It is generally known as the problem of affection or the problem of the Thing-in-itself. Authors as early as Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi¹ have alerted the peculiar difficulty or inconsistency in Kant's system which is made up by the

¹ I want to stress here that the following treatment is primarily focused on the standard version of the problem of affection. It is commonly associated with the name of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, although his argument is actually different and more refined (cf. Sandkaulen, 2007).

nature of Affection. This notion is extremely important for the present exposition, and should therefore first be illustrated briefly.

The contradiction is said to occur between two separate theses of the First Critique. The first of these theses is to be found at the beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic and states that Sensibility is a faculty of knowledge which gives its information immediately and passively. The passivity of the human mind is characterized as receptivity (Rezeptivität) and as effected through "Affection" (Kant, 1976, A 19 / B 33)². Kant states explicitly that in Sensibility, we are affected by Objects (1976, A 19 / B 33).

The second doctrine which seems to oppose or render nonsensical the affection-doctrine, is to be found in the Transcendental Analytic. There, Kant claims that objects are constituted by the Understanding through the categories. As a result, the talk of objects on the level of Sensibility is preposterous, since the very nature of objectivity cannot precede Sensibility. Furthermore, Kant denies the possibility of applying the notions of substantiality and causality to anything other than the immanent, empirical, sensibly received objects. He seems, therefore, to violate this very principle when he claims that we receive sensations from Things-in-themselves which causally interact with our Mind (Gemüt).

This is the broad outline of one of the central problems of the Kantian system, one that has been taken up very often and has generated a large number of different, sometimes remarkably ingenious and even remarkably un-Kantian interpretations. It is not my intention to discuss in detail over two centuries of literature on this subject. Neither will I formulate a full answer to the present-day discussion on the meaning of Transcendental Idealism, which stresses the importance of the statements in the antinomies and the legitimacy of transcendental arguments for an account of the metaphysical implications of Kant's theory. These discussions will take me far beyond the scope of this paper. I will limit my sketch to those insights which are instrumental for the remarks on anticipation.

The answers to the problem of affection generally follow one of two strategies. The first claims that, although Kant does speak of Things-in-themselves at the beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic, *this claim is subsequently refuted by the Kantian theory itself*. These remarks cannot be seen as anything other than provisional and serve to introduce the reader into his philosophy, without having to start off with qualifications which need the full theory to be understandable. The other strategy claims that Kant does not speak of things in themselves at all, but is speaking of empirical affection: we are affected only by the objects of constitution. In some cases, we see both theories intermingling in a different account.³

In my opinion, both these accounts miss the essential point Kant attempts to make here. He is not, I believe, speaking merely of the affection of the 'Gemüt' by things in themselves. The very usage of the word Object (Gegenstand), which can almost only refer to the product of constitution in the Analytic, and therefore to the technical term used in Kant's theory, suggests that he is not ascribing the affecting power to the Thing-

² I refer to the page numbers of works by Kant in the conventional way, i.e. to the page numbers of the A and B editions for the First Critique, and to the page numbers of the Akademie Ausgabe for other works.

³ Cf for instance Beck's theory (summarized in Vaihinger 1970 (II, 41-42)), or Adickes (1929).

in-itself. Dismissing this usage of the word 'Object' as a provisional, common-sense claim that is refuted or qualified further on, is unnecessary unless no sense can be made of it otherwise. I believe that there is a very important sense in which these remarks touch upon the nature of the Thing-in-itself in Kant's Theory without having to assume that the word "Gegenstand" is meant to refer to it here.

Now we have to look at the precise formulation. Kant states that:

Auf welche Art und durch welche Mittel sich auch immer eine Erkenntnis auf Gegenstände beziehen mag, es ist doch diejenige, wodurch sie sich auf dieselbe unmittelbar bezieht, und worauf alles Denken als Mittel abzweckt, die Anschauung. Diese findet aber nur statt, sofern uns der Gegenstand gegeben wird; dieses aber ist wiederum, uns Menschen wenigstens, nur dadurch möglich, dass er das Gemüt auf gewisse Weise affiziere. Die Fähigkeit (Rezeptivität), Vorstellungen durch die Art, wie wir von Gegenstände affiziert werden, zu bekommen, heißt Sinnlichkeit. Vermittelt der Sinnlichkeit also werden uns Gegenstände gegeben, und sie allein liefern uns Anschauungen; durch den Verstand werden sie gedacht, und von ihm entspringen Begriffe. (Kant 1976 B 33)

This lengthy quotation is in place because it contains a large number of important elements for the analysis. I would like to call attention to three of these. In the first place, It is clear that Kant is trying to show us something about Objects (Gegenstände), and not about Things-in-themselves. The object he speaks of is therefore the internalized object of the Transcendental Analytic, and reflects his considered opinion on this subject.⁴ Second, Kant makes clear that he is stating something about the way we, human beings, have access to knowledge. This particular mode is that of passivity: we are passive in respect to the empirical element of our thought. Thirdly, Kant also means to contrast Sensibility with Understanding. Neither of these elements is negligible or arbitrary. On the contrary, they all refer to important doctrines held by Kant in the Critical period, and serve to make out the actual view he is expressing here. Especially the second and third remarks need further elaboration.

In the second edition Kant adds a remark on the nature of the intellect he is discussing. Apparently, he is speaking of human knowledge, and not of a different kind of knowledge. What is this different kind of knowledge? Whenever Kant speaks of human knowledge in contrast to another kind, he conceives the opposite as infinite, i.e. divine knowledge, which he calls "intellectual intuition" (Kant, 1976, B 72). In the Transcendental Deduction of the B-Edition, he characterizes intellectual intuition in the following way: "[...]wollte ich mir ein Verstand denken, der selbst anschaute (wie etwa einen göttlichen, der *nicht gegebene* Gegenstände sich vorstellte, sondern durch dessen Vorstellung die Gegenstände selbst zugleich gegeben, oder *hervorgebracht* würden) [...]" (Kant, 1976, B 145, my stress) What Kant means is that in knowledge, man is always thrown back on elements which he has not created by himself. The empirical element is not, or not demonstrably, due to our own activity. God, who relies on nothing but his own power, creates ex nihilo, creates the very objects he knows, and is therefore

⁴ I agree, at least in this respect, with a remark by Béatrice Longuenesse (1998, 22)

never really confronted with the empirical. In this respect, Heidegger was right to take the finiteness, the passiveness of knowledge as the starting point of Kant's theory. (Heidegger, 1929, 23)

The other contrast Kant introduces in order to make his account of affection understood is that between Sensibility and Understanding. Kant repeats this opposition at the beginning of the Transcendental Logic. The basic contrast is that whereas Sensibility is intuitive and passive, Understanding is discursive and active (i.e. spontaneous). In both formulations of the contrast, Kant confuses the reader by stating that Sensibility gives the object. This is problematic because Kant will propose later on, in the Transcendental Deduction, that the object only comes into being as the product of constitution. Therefore, it is remarkable that Sensibility can already give it. This, however, is all just a matter of a confusing choice of words. What Kant would seem to mean is precisely what is communicated in the remark on divine intellect quoted earlier, namely that Sensibility is responsible for the being-given of the object, whereas Understanding is responsible for its being-an-object, i.e. its objectivity.

All we need now is one further remark to complete the picture. We have seen that Sensibility is typical for finite intellects, since these are not themselves responsible for the empirical element of the object. Because of this, they experience the object that they constitute as depending on other conditions than merely those of the Gemüt as having a source outside of the Gemüt. Gemüt, as a result, is in a certain sense passive with respect to its content. The Thing-in-itself, in the sense in which it is used on the first page of the Transcendental Aesthetic, refers to nothing more than this passivity. The last piece of evidence needed to complete this reasoning, is to be found in the chapter on Phaenomena and Noumena:

Wenn wir unter Noumenon ein Ding verstehen, so fern es nicht Objekt unserer Anschauung ist, indem wir von unserer Anschauungsart desselben abstrahieren; so ist dieses ein Noumenon im negativen Verstande. Verstehen wir aber darunter ein Objekt einer nichtsinnlichen Anschauung, so nehmen wir eine besondere Anschauungsart an, nämlich die intellektuelle, die aber nicht die unsrige ist, von welcher wir auch die Möglichkeit nicht einsehen können, und das wäre das Noumenon in positiver Bedeutung. (Kant, 1976, B 307)

This quotation clearly contrasts the negative and positive meanings of noumenon, or Thing-in-itself, through the concept of a non-sensible intuition. It would be peculiar if Kant meant by this anything other than the intellectual intuition he associates with the idea of God. Therefore, I believe this passage corroborates the view that the notion of the Thing-in-itself is related to the principle of heterogeneity, the principle that in so far as knowledge is concerned, the human mind is thrown back on elements which are somehow not of its own making and need to be integrated in it through a complex operation.

To conclude this section, I would like to stress that this exposition in itself is not satisfactory as an interpretation of Kant's theory of Transcendental Idealism. It is merely a piece of such an account. It is used here primarily as a means to show how the

doctrine of Transcendental Idealism is connected with Anticipation, and introduces the necessity of the latter. To see how this necessity is played out in the rest of Kant's work, is the objective of the rest of this paper.

3 The form of Sensibility and anticipative unity

We have seen in the previous section that the Thing-in-itself serves, in the Aesthetic, to clarify the fact that, for Kant, human knowledge is essentially faced with an element which is foreign to it, or is at least necessarily experienced as foreign to it. He links this, furthermore, to the necessity of the faculty of Sensibility. It seems that the latter would have no place in a kind of knowledge which immediately grasps its object as such. To see why this is so, we need to examine Kant's account of Form.

According to Kant, Sensibility builds its products out of two distinct elements. On the one hand, there is the product of affection, the empirical element in the sensible. Kant calls this Sensation or *Empfindung*, the matter of an appearance (*Erscheinung*)⁵. On the other hand, we have the form of Sensibility, which Kant introduces in the following manner: "dasjenige aber, welches macht, dass das Mannigfaltige der Erscheinung in gewissen Verhältnisse geordnet werden kann, nenne ich die Form der Erscheinung." (Kant, 1976, B 34) To understand what is said here, we need a further remark, this time about external Sensibility: "Der Raum ist nicht anders, als nur die Form aller Erscheinungen äußerer Sinne, d.i. die subjektive Bedingung der Sinnlichkeit, unter der allein uns äußere Anschauung möglich ist." (Kant, 1976, B 42) From these two remarks we can extract the following elements of Kant's doctrine:

First of all, the form of outer Sensibility is the condition for the possibility of receptivity. This is important because it indicates that mind can contribute something to Sensibility without ceasing to be a passive receptive faculty. What it needs to contribute is the minimal condition for passive reception. The element this condition contributes is the possibility of ordering sensation in a determinate manner. It would seem that the minimal condition is precisely the possibility of being ordered itself. This will prove to be important further on.

To extract the second important element of Kant's doctrine implied by these remarks, we need to get a little more specific. In particular, we will have to bring up an old controversy on the nature of the form of Sensibility in order to arrive at the meaning of the notion of Form. The old controversy focused on Kant's statement that the nature of space, and therefore of geometrical qualities, can be known a priori, because the form of Sensibility is a priori and can be intuited apart from its empirical content as a so-called pure intuition (*reine Anschauung*) (Kant, 1976, A 20 / B 34-35). This brought up two questions: in what way is space a priori, and more importantly: precisely how much of space can be intuited in advance?⁶ Many thinkers seemed to believe Kant either could not conceive space as a priori at all, or had to regard everything about space as a priori.

⁵ I wish to use this term here as broadly as possible, in order to avoid the difficulties which any attempt to define it more clearly must face.

⁶ A lengthy discussion of this controversy throughout the nineteenth century can be found in Vaihinger, 1970 (II, 35-55).

This would mean that the shape of whatever we are to experience next is already fixed in full and in advance in our mind. No contingent element can be brought to bear upon the geometrical qualities or size of an empirical object (Vaihinger, 1970, II, 73). This is obviously both counterintuitive and in contradiction with the heterogeneity and unpredictability of empirical information.⁷

If we are to get out of this conundrum, we are to find a way in which the form of Sensibility can both contribute a non-arbitrary element to an empirical intuition and be unable to deliver information of such a determinate kind on its own, i.e. in absence of or in abstraction from the matter of Sensibility. This means we cannot conceive of the two elements of Sensibility as elements with a determinate content which can be linked by conjunction. We need, on the contrary, an interpretation which allows that matter is determinate but incapable of structure, whereas form is indeterminate but capable of structure.

I wish to suggest now that we can find an analogy for the relation between form and matter in the relation between a function and its argument. A function has no outcome of its own, but only a series of possible outcomes. This is what Kant could be speaking of when he is claiming that geometry is a priori: we can say something about the possible outcomes of a function without having the actual argument. The argument itself, however, is of little use to us unless it can be described as a function itself. Kant seems to believe that only functions have the minimal condition of structure which allow us to relate different arguments to each other.

We need, however, to qualify the previous statement. It would seem that commensurability of sensations, which are otherwise, as Kant calls it, a manifold and therefore radically heterogeneous, is guaranteed by Sensibility. Nonetheless, Sensibility cannot exact the processes which serve to relate and compare intuitions. It is merely passive, and can do no more than present the present content. For this reason, Sensibility is useless unless it is present as a preparatory step for knowledge of a discursive kind. This is why I am tempted to speak of Sensibility as an anticipatory kind of unity, which has no informative content in itself, but serves to interiorize the heterogeneous element of intuition in two ways: on the one hand allowing it to be 'given' to the understanding in the form of an empirical intuition; on the other hand, allowing it to conform to the conditions of Sensibility and thus to be rendered commensurable in this respect. To see the importance of this theory, we need to advance to the so-called anticipations of sense-perception.

4 The anticipations of sense-perception

I want to begin by briefly indicating the place the anticipations take in the first Critique. This requires a very brief sketch of the Transcendental Analytic up to that point. Here, Kant discusses the part played by the faculty called Understanding in the constitution of

⁷ See for instance Paton's answer to the problem: "Only what is strictly universal is imposed by the mind upon objects. Empirical differences are particular determinations of the universal, but their particularity is not due to the mind and must be due to things." (Paton, 1936, I, 139).

knowledge. First of all, he characterizes Understanding as a discursive, mediate faculty, which works through concepts (Begriffe). Concepts are, according to Kant, representations of the rules by which we have synthesized a given manifold. Synthesis should here be taken, first of all, in its most basic sense, namely "putting-together" (compositio). This happens for instance when we subsume a number of instances under a given concept: subsumption means finding a rule by which we can indicate similarities among the concepts. It is important to notice that a concept is not a paradigm instance, nor the ideal form of the instances, but simply the rule describing their relation to each other.

Synthesis is the key-term of the Analytic, since here Kant takes up the task of justifying this operation, showing that it is only rendered possible by a certain number of pure concepts, which he calls "categories", and conceives as the transcendental equivalents of operations in formal logic. In the Transcendental Analytic, he indicates how these categories enable us to conceive objects, by which he means the underlying factor of unity which connects a number of otherwise heterogeneous intuitions. One of these categories is Quality, and is the equivalent of existence in Logic. When this category is schematized, we get the so-called Anticipations of sense-perception.

As Kant is concerned, among other things, in the Analytic, with showing that the practice of relating different intuitions with each other is justified and necessary, the role of Sensibility becomes clear. It enables the theoretically engaged subject to relate intuitions, because they share important elements: spatiality and temporality. The connection of different intuitions is, however, not arbitrary. She progresses in accordance with a rule. This means that Understanding demands a certain respect towards the empirical element in thought. Furthermore, as the anticipations refer to quality or existence, they are very clearly linked to the matter of Sensibility and thus to heterogeneity as such.

The anticipations of sense-perception are grouped together with the axioms of intuition under the heading of the mathematical principles, which are merely related to intuition (Kant, 1976, A 160 / B 199). As we have seen, the two elements belonging to intuition are form and matter. The axioms deal with form, and determine it in terms of extensive magnitude. Space and time have parts which extend over smaller parts. The anticipations, in contrast, deal with the real, the matter in experience. This involves a difficulty, which Kant indicates as follows: "Da aber an den Erscheinungen etwas ist, was niemals a priori erkannt wird, und welches daher auch den eigentlichen Unterschied des Empirischen von dem Erkenntnis a priori ausmacht, nämlich die Empfindung (als Materie der Wahrnehmung), so folgt, dass diese es eigentlich sei, was gar nicht antizipiert werden kann." (Kant, 1976, A 167 / B 208-209) We see Kant referring back to his theory of affection, which we have analyzed in the previous sections. Since the matter of intuition is necessarily a posteriori and necessarily distinct from the constituting subject, it can never be determined a priori by the Understanding. Form always comes to us in the same guise (space or time), so its precise determinations can be fixed in advance. Experiences of space or time can only be quantitatively different. In contrast, sensation can present itself to us in qualitatively different ways, which results in the fact that Understanding is unable to guarantee that it covers all possible

dimensions. Therefore, Understanding is thrown back on a strangely limited kind of determination.

Kant answers this problem by claiming that the a priori determination of sensation consists in intensive magnitude. He starts off by indicating that we have, a priori, the contrast between, on the one hand, empirical consciousness, where the real is present, and can be given the value "1", and on the other hand pure consciousness, where no empirical element is present and the value of the empirical would thus be equal to "0". Kant's next and important step consists in claiming that we can think an infinite gradation of changes between one and zero, so that the intensity of experience can be conceived in a way analogous to the determination of the form of intuition in the axioms of intuition.

The importance of this theory is twofold. On the one hand, we see that Kant is at last capable of determining the radically heterogeneous element in experience. He does this by imposing a certain kind of magnitude on it, allowing it to be related to the pure, a priori form. To return to the characterization used in the previous section, it shows how the argument can itself be translated into a function, and can thus become part of the structural system. This is the reason why I spoke earlier of the form of Sensibility as an anticipatory unity: in it, the argument is not yet fully integrated in the formal or structural system. On the other hand, however, the anticipations serve to introduce the heterogeneous into thought. That which is by definition pure and spontaneous can now be faced with an empirical element in respect of which it is passive. It is passive because it can and must determine it, but can do this only in a peculiarly limited way.

The anticipations are fundamental in the *Transcendental Analytic*, since they are the only principles that enable the empirical to be introduced into thought. This is often strangely overlooked, and has resulted in a quite dismissive treatment of this remarkable section.⁸ Furthermore, a dismissive attitude towards the anticipations risks missing another important element of Kant's philosophy, an element which is mostly implicit in the first and second *Critiques*, but will eventually lead to the writing of the *Critique of Judgment*. It points unequivocally towards the finiteness of human thought and towards the openness of the constitutive subject in regard to the contingency of experience.

5 The interest of anticipation

In the *Transcendental Dialectic*, Kant continues with what it is generally seen as a masterful but sometimes over-architectonic criticism of traditional metaphysics. Though it cannot be doubted that Kant is engaged in such an enterprise, the traditional representation of the section misses a number of important points which Kant attempts to make here, and which are downright crucial for a correct understanding of the whole of *Critical Philosophy*. The positive message of the *Dialectic* is presented in the *Appendix*. This is a peculiar and perhaps even regrettable choice, since it nourishes the misunderstanding that he is somehow less theoretically engaged and interested in this

⁸ See for instance Wolff (1963, 238) and Guyer (1987, 175).

section. Nonetheless, it is precisely here that many of the crucial elements of transcendental philosophy enter the scene, such as the importance of system and ideals. The weight Kant puts on the negative function of the Dialectic can be easily explained by his commitment to Transcendental Idealism. Kant is engaged in cutting off every path towards fixing that which is behind our empirical information. Some will argue that the primary way in which he does this is to prove that the application of the forms of Sensibility and Understanding to a transcendently real world results in ineluctable contradictions. This is of course the argument of the antinomies.⁹ The Paralogisms, in which Kant attempts to criticize metaphysical assumptions about the nature of the thinking being, can also be read as arguments for Transcendental Idealism. Usually, however, Kant's final analysis, the refutation of the possibility of proving God's existence, is treated with "very moderate enthusiasm"(Strawson, 1966, 207). This is undoubtedly due to the misconception that this discussion is merely an addendum to Kant's philosophy, showing how it can be used to criticize dogmatic views. What is wrong with this characterization of Kant's criticism of the proofs for the existence of God is precisely that it misses the important epistemological role played by the notion of the highest being in his Transcendental Idealism. I have shown earlier how the finiteness of the human mind is an important starting point for the whole talk of constitution. The subject does not experience itself as the source of its sensation, and thus does not have, in advance, the definite rule which grasps the concept of the object. It can only *constitute* the object through rules, but cannot *construct* them. If however, the finite subject would be able to prove that there is a God, then he could search for the rule of construction utilized by him. This entails an indirect access to the Thing in itself. Kant needs to cut off this path in order to be able to continue to characterize our knowledge as necessarily limited.

This point becomes especially important in light of Kant's vigorous criticism of the false comfort caused by the belief that one can reason from God. He warns for two distinct mistakes one tends to make under the influence of this misconception. The first he calls Lazy Reason (*ignava ratio*), which consists in stopping the investigation of nature at a random point (Kant, 1976, A 689-690 / B 717-718). When one makes the second mistake, that of Perverse Reason, one imposes the idea of teleology on nature, instead of continuing one's search for it (Kant, 1976, A 692 / B 721). In result, one can have faith in the fact that experience will exhibit a rule-governed structure. Subsequently, one no longer needs to dredge through the infinite stock of experience in order to determine the object. The second mistake would entail that we simply seek, through rational deliberation, to find the plan we can most plausibly attribute to God. The first, on the other hand, consists in ceasing research altogether, since it is no longer necessary to seek a rule: it is simply there, and we can take comfort in that.

Kant's theory is radically opposed to both these tactics. On the one hand, he insists that the idea of the teleological structure of nature continues to engage us and to require us to keep searching. We can never take comfort in knowing that we will eventually find the one rule behind the object, nor can we ever suppose that there even is such a rule.

⁹ This view has been most adequately formulated and defended by Guyer (1987, 333-369).

Nonetheless, we must suppose there is, or our entire system of constitution is futile. The very fact that the subject is the locus of constitution implies that it has an interest in the possibility of constitution, i.e. in the possibility that its search for rules in synthesis can grasp the heterogeneous matter of Sensibility.

This peculiar interest the subject has in the possibility of constitution, and especially in relation to its finiteness in regard to the rule of the object, comes to the surface of Kant's writings in the third Critique. Here, Kant speaks of the thus far merely mentioned faculty of Judgment, which is a mediating faculty and serves to think the specific under the general (Kant, 2001, AA 179). It can come in two different forms: determinative judgment, which subsumes an object under a concept when the concept or rule is already known, and reflective judgment, which proceeds from the object and attempts to find the rule behind it (Kant, 2001, AA 179). In the light of my previous remarks, one can easily see that reflective judgment is what Kant is most concerned about here. It should, therefore, not come as a surprise that he links this idea explicitly to teleology, the supposition of which allows us to assume that the structure of nature corresponds to our epistemological interests, even though we cannot regard any semblance of it as more than merely coincidental (Kant, 2001, AA 186).

What we need is one further element, which touches upon the nature of the epistemic interest in a rule-like structure. Kant states that there is a feeling of pleasure and pain to be connected with this pure interest, as in the case of any other interest (Kant, 2001, AA 187). This is the cornerstone of Kant's theory of the Beautiful. Here, he unites his complete refusal of the imposition of the rule-like structure on the manifold with his radical insistence on our epistemological obligation to this idea. The following statement on the nature of the Beautiful serves perfectly to illustrate this point: "Schönheit ist Form der Zweckmäßigkeit eines Gegenstandes, sofern sie ohne Vorstellung eines Zwecks an ihm wahrgenommen wird." (Kant, 2001, AA 236) To complete the circle, I need to indicate that an object which is called beautiful is deemed qualitatively perfect, and not quantitatively (Kant, 2001, AA 227). This is important in light of my previous remark that the anticipations reflect the category of quality and are responsible for the very possibility of integrating that which is not just quantitatively, but also qualitatively different. This remarkable choice of words returns, furthermore, when Kant identifies the beautiful with the qualitative feeling (Kant, 2001, AA 266). What this means is that it is accompanied by a certain state of representation in the subject where Sensibility (or rather Imagination) and Understanding are in harmony. The importance of this harmony testifies that the very possibility of knowledge and even of constitution is laden with tension.

6 Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to tie up the main points I have sought to make. I have attempted to indicate the central place of anticipation in the Kantian system, especially in his theoretical philosophy. Anticipation, I have suggested, is subjective in two ways: it is not strictly epistemically justifiable, and it is linked to interest. In Kant's theory, the radical heterogeneity of the matter of Sensibility cuts off any attempt to go about the

matter in a merely epistemic manner, and his theory on the pure feeling of pleasure and pain as bound up with reflective judgment, provides the link to interest. Kant's theory is interesting because it allows for inadequacy without becoming skeptical, and allows for interest without becoming relativist. In an epistemological account which is to address these difficulties, a notion such as anticipation may be a useful. Furthermore, I have attempted to show how Kant embeds his account of anticipation in a theory of an actively engaged, finite transcendental subject which differentiates itself in faculties in order to constitute the wave of contingency it continually faces. The introduction of such a subject notion in philosophy may therefore prove to be useful.

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