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    <title>Auteurs : Anton Froeyman</title>
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    <description>Publications of Auteurs Anton Froeyman</description>
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      <title>Anticipation and the Constitution of Time in the Philosophy of Ernst Cassire</title>
      <link>https://popups.uliege.be/3041-539x/index.php?id=4609</link>
      <description>In this paper, I will argue with Ernst Cassirer that anticipation plays an essential part in the constitution of time, as seen from a transcendental perspective. Time is, as any transcendental concept, regarded as basically relational and subjective and only in a derivative way objective and indifferent to us. This entails that memory is prior to history, and that anticipation is prior to prediction. In this paper, I will give some examples in order to argue for this point. Furthernore, I will also argue, again with Cassirer and contra Henri Bergson, that time should be seen as a functional unity, and not as a collection of three different things-in-themselves (past, present and future). </description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 14 Oct 2024 15:18:27 +0200</pubDate>
      <lastBuildDate>Mon, 14 Oct 2024 15:18:34 +0200</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>Ethics, Aesthetics and the Anticipaton of the Unanticipatable</title>
      <link>https://popups.uliege.be/3041-539x/index.php?id=3346</link>
      <description>In this paper, I will present what I take to be a standard view of morality, and I argue that this view amounts to a paradox : the moral event or moral concern, the source of morality, ultimately leads, through moral theory, to a denial of itself. I will show how Badiou and Levinas take a way out of this and in doing so deny the possibility of anticipating the moral. Furthermore, I claim that this anticipatory moment can be introduced back by means of the concept of &quot;practical wisdom&quot; as used in analytical virtue ethics. Finally, I argue that the Kantian notion of the sublime is structurally the same as the moral event in Badiou and Levinas, and that our view of the sublime can benefit from both Levinas' view and the concept of &quot;practical wisdom&quot; as well. </description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Sep 2024 16:38:34 +0200</pubDate>
      <lastBuildDate>Fri, 13 Sep 2024 16:38:42 +0200</lastBuildDate>
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